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CRA.PI'D I 
INTRODUOTION 
!his thesis proposes to analyze Ralph Waldo Emerson's 
conoept 01 skeptioi.m and his dootrine of the infinitude 
of the private man in terms of what each i8 in itself and 
how eaoh relate. to the other. Initially, the nature of 
Emerson's skeptioism will be studied. !hen, in the light 
of this analysis, the infinitude do~trine will be examined. 
A oonclusion as to their relationship will be offered. A 
summary of the argument will tollow. 
The investigation ot Emerson's oonoept ot skepticism 
and his infinitude dootrine has brought the writer to gripe 
with the following materials. the major eSBays in which 
Emerson has dealt with the problem--in the main, "Circles," 
"Experience," "Montaigne, or, The SkeptiC," and "Fate", 
the corresponding Journals and, in 80.e oase., portions of 
the Journals which do not correspond in time but do in 
subjeot matter, i.e., a note upon a subjeot pertinent to 
skepticism that ia delivered in later years purely as an 
1 
2 
afterthought but i8 in itself illuminating, and, lastly, the 
appropriate soholarship written in the area. 
As to the history, the truth and falsity, of the problem 
presented, no exaot comment can be made as no history of the 
precise nature of the problem has been located. A study of 
Emerson's skepticism--not, however, of his infinitude theory--
is Oharles Lowell Young's Emerson's Montaigne (New York, 
1941). A study that approaches Emerson's doctrine of the 
infinitude of the private man is J. O. McOormick's "Emerson's 
Theory of Human Greatness,·f !!.! England Quarterly, XXVI 
(September, 195'). 291-314. Neither study deals essentially 
with the subject matter of this paper. 
Charles Lowell Young's Emerson's Montaigne is in the 
main a biographical study of the life and prinoiples of 
a man who in depth contributed to Emerson's conoept of 
skepticism. Chapter-wise, Young deals with llfontaigne sep-
arately as man, writer, moralist, and skeptic. He devotes 
an additional ohapter to"Emereon'e Acquaintance with 
Montaigne." This study will differ from Young's in that 
it shall be concern.ed primarily with Emerson' s notion of 
skepticism and shall be concerned with Montaigne's concept 
only insofar as it sieves through Emerson. 
Where !'oCormiokts study differs from the immediate one 
is in its devotion to an enumeration and disoussion of those 
persons in history Emerson thought notably superior and 
in its detailed examination of many of the roots in history 
of Emerson's ooncept of greatness. The immediate study is 
not historioal. It is expositional. It explains one portion 
of Emerson's philosophical belief. It alludes to history 
only when, in the mind of this writer, an explanation of 
the historical root of an idea that Emerson had serves to 
illuminate the idea itself. 
Since there can be located no single, unified, detailed 
exposition of either Emerson's concept of skepticism or of 
his doctrine of the infinitude of the private man, and 
since there oan be looated no study of the relationship 
this writer finds to exist between these two areas of 
thought, the purpose of this paper is to explain these areas 
of thought and to point out the relationship that exists 
between them. 
CHAPTER II 
SKEPTICISM: "OIRCLES" AN"D "EXPERIENCE" 
Of Ralph Waldo Emerson's major essays, there are four 
which, in the main, are detailed presentations of that 
author's concept of skepticism. They are "Circles," 
"Experience," "Montaigne, or, 'l'he Skeptio," and "Fate."l 
Each essay offers an aspect or aspects of Emerson's skep-
tical thought; and each, while a unit in itself, inter-
twines with and supplements the skepticism of the other. 
The function of "Circles" in the text of Emersonian 
skepticism is that of a prologue, for, in c1aiming·that 
"permanence is but a word of degrees, .. 2 the essay posits 
in introduction a basic principle that ribs that body of 
skeptical thought which its trio of companions embellishes 
and develope. 
1stephen Whioher, ed., Seleotions from Ra~~~ ~aldo 
Emerson (Boston, 1957), pp. 168-178, 25~4' -301, 
"0-352. 
2Ra1ph Waldo Emerson, "Cirolee,1f in Ibid., p. 168. 
Emerson adds: "OUr globe seen by ~od is a transparent 
law, not a mass of facts." 
4 
5 
One cannot deny that the "essay shows signs that Emerson 
at the time of writing was appreciably unsettled."" He 
was, however, more than unsettled: he was, or was coming 
to be, preoccupied with the negative import of the flux in 
nature that he, in prior moments of indefatigable optimism, 
would have found easy to ignore. nCircles," then, is the 
voice of this gruwing unrest: 4 
"Circles" is single among Emersonian essays--
single in its daring. Brief passages in other 
essays dare as much, but nowhere else is the 
animating principle ot a discourse so ventur-
ous. • • • The ttflux ft has been much dwelt upon, 
but one doubts if the realization ot the plas-
tioity ot the universe (in distinction from the 
mere slipperiness ot the personal life) has 
ever elsewhere reached the point attended in 
"Circles." 
The lack ot permanence that Emerson sees in "Circlestt 
is resident in no speoifio area 01 lite. Everything in 
existenoe tlits and meanders. "Nature ever flows, stands 
"stephen Whicher, Freedom and Fate (Philadelphia, 
195.,). p. 97. ---
40scar W. Firkins, Ralph Waldo Emerson (Boston, 1915), 
p. 188. 
never still. Motion or ohange is her mode of existenoe. u5 
'Nothing--nature, man, nor knowledge--is stable. Nature 
6 
has uno fixtures"t 6 the univeree always eddies in a vortex. 
Man is without brim, he never fille with knowled~e. New 
thought at every moment enters existence;7 yet to be born, 
ultimate knowledge will never be oonoeived: "Every ultim-
ate fact is only the first of a new series. Every general 
law only a particular fact of some more general law pres-
ently to disolose itself. There is no outside, no enclosing 
wall, no oiroumference to us.,,8 Everything in 1ife--nature, 
man, knowledge--both enjoys and endures a spinning existenoe. 
and to this spinning existence the wise man rivets hie 
5Ralph waldo Emerson, Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson, 
eds. Edward Waldo Emerson and Wildo !merson Forbes (~oston, 
1909-1914), V, 494. 
6Emerson, "Circles," p. 169. 
7Ibid., p. 171. "The last chamber, the last closet, 
he must reel was never opened, there is always a residuum 
unknown, unanalyzable. '!'hat is, every man believes that 
he has a greater possibility." 
8 Ibid., p. 170. 
attention. 9 
As an essa.y, "Circles ft does more for the body of 
Emersonian skeptioism than Berve as a mere introduotion. 
~ot only does it oontain the soil in whioh Emerson's 
skeptioism begins to take root, but the essay also, in 
what is necessarily miorooosmio fashion, deals with the 
nature of the skeptioism itself. For in "Ciroles" Emer-
son first assays a problem tha.t he will oonsider in more 
oomplete terms at a later time. namely, the true tone 
of a valid skepticism. In doin~ so, he gives the reader 
one view of what he believes the real, the actual skeptio 
must bet10 
And thus, 0 circular philosopher, I hear some 
reader exclaim, you have arrived at a fine 
9Emerson, Journals, X, 238. As late as 1868, 
Emerson, still fascinated by the oiroles of nature's 
existence and the obligation of man to them, said, uOur 
little oircles absorb and oocupy us as fully aa the 
heavens; we oan minimize as infinitely as maximize t and the only way out of it i8 (to use a country phrase) to 
kick the pail over, and acoept the horizon instead of the 
pail, with celestial a.ttraotions and influences, instead 
of worms a~d mud pies." (Ibid.) 
-
l°Emorson, '·Circles," p. 176. 
7 
Pyrrhonism, at an equivalence and indifferency 
of all actions, and would fain teach us that 
if we are true, forsooth, our crimes may be 
lively atones out of which we shall construct 
the temple of the true God. • • • But lest I 
should mislead any when I have my own head and 
obey my own whims, let me remind the reader 
that I am only an experimenter. Do not set 
the least value on what I do, or the least 
discredit on what I do not, as if I pretended 
to settle any things as true or false. I 
unsettle all things. No facts are to me saored, 
none are profane, I simply experiment, an endless 
seekar with no Past at my back •. 
8 
Here, Emerson, with a "fresh consciousness of imperman-
enoe in his own thought,,,ll immediately disallows his oritics 
the negative possibility of equating his oonoept of the 
skeptic with their interpretation of it as the scoffer. Emer-
son wants very muoh to establish the legitimaoy of his skeptio, 
and this aocomplishment, as shall be seen, he achieves to a 
greater degree in "~~ontaign.eJ or, The Skeptic. tt In "Circles, It 
however, Emerson quite seriously informs hie audience that 
llWhicher, Freedom and Fate, p. 94. Of Emersonts state 
of mind ai this time, WtiIclieF0'6servesl "Numerous indica-
tions in Lsome of his most interesting essaysJ and in hi. journals, betray his disturbed awareness that the pattern 
of his first conviotions is undergoing an unforeseen modif-
ioation, and that the various truths he has oome to recog-
nize are in radioal and permanent oonflict with eaoh other." 
(~.) 
the skeptic is not, by neoessity, a pessimist. Nor, by 
the same token, Emerson asserts, is the skeptio neoessarily 
an optimist. For Emerson, the skeptio in essenoe is an 
experimenter, an unsettler: one who waits, watohes, and 
sees. And at this time, Emerson is ardently oonvinced of 
the validity of his position. 
If in "Oiro1es" Emerson has, so to speak, prepared 
the reader with an introduotion for the soope of the skep-
tioa1 thought that is in the remaining three essays yet 
to evolve, he has in the second of them, "Experienoe,,,12 
delineated the oharacter of man, the individual, who will 
come to grips with this skepticis~ and has itemized the 
many problems he will face in the thick of his traffio 
with it. For it is in "Experience" that Emerson asserts 
that man knows "that the world [he converses] with in the 
9 
l2F~ederick Ives Oarpenter, Emerson Handbook (New 
York, 1953), p. 62. On the literary aspects ot "Experienoe,'· 
Oarpenter states: t'Although 'Experience' seems to have 
been written spontaneously and at white heat, its struoture 
is carefully planned and its development olear and logical." (Ibid. ) 
city and in the 'lams, is not the world [he] thinks,"l3 
that the theory of life has no actual twin in its practice, 
and that man must forever be faced with cosmetics and not 
reality. 
In 'tExperience" Emerson discusses and explains the 
Lords of Life. Of the extent of their oontribution to 
his skeptioal mood, it has been noted that "now he finds 
that the self on which he would rely is governed by an 
incongruous set of oonditions whioh he oan neither reoon-
cile nor control."l4 
Emerson believed that each Lord waa an active agent 
in eaoh man'. lite. Each Lord manifested itself in an 
individual's life in a variety of ways, and each appeared 
to no two men in exaotly the same fashion. This condition, 
l3Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Experienoe," Selections from 
Ral~~ Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whicher (~oston, 1957), 
p. 3. On this differenoe in his mind between the world 
as it is and as he thinks it, Emerson adds. "One day I 
shall know the value and law of this discrepance. But I 
have not found that much was gained by manipular attempts 
10 
to realize the world of thought. Many eager persons success-
ively make an experiment in this way, and make themselves 
ridiculous." (~.) 
l4Whicher, Freedom and !!!!, p. 111. 
Emerson divined, caused eaoh man to interpret life in his 
unique manner, and, as suoh, it denied all possibility of 
any universally homogenous interpretation. 
Emerson first explains, then lists, the Lords of Life. 
He claims that he can give them no specific order as they 
are but a "fragment of me" and "I am but a fragment'" 15 
"Illusion, Temperament, Succession, surfaoe, Surprise, 
Reality, SUbjeotiveness,--these are threads on the loom 
of time, these are the lords of life. I dare not assume to 
give their order, but I name them a8 I find them in my 
way. " 
Emerson olarifies his idea of the Subjectiveness16 of 
each man through his personal assertion of eaoh mants 
individuality, whioh, he believes, is displayed in two 
distinot areas. namely, man in his relation to nature and 
15Emerson, "Experienoe," p. 272. 
l6Emerson, Journals, X, 468. In his Journale, 
some twenty years after he first disoussed Subjed~1veness, 
Emerson turned to it onoe again: "Dangerously great, 
immoral even in its violence of power. The man sees 8S 
he is." (Ibid.) 
11 
12 
man in his relation to man. The substance of the former idea 
is that each man first tints the universe with the hue of 
his subjective existence; that he then interprets the oom-
posite result, and that his personal interpretation is, by 
its very nature, markedly different from whatever other 
interpretation a separate individual mignt offer. 17 
To explain to his reader the latter idea--man in his 
relation to man--Emerson speaks metaphorically. He refers to 
the individual man as a globe, and, for illustrative purposes, 
asks the reader to imagine two globes juxtaposed.18 
There will be the same gulf between every me and 
thee as between the original and the pioture. 
The universe 1s the bride of the soul. All 
private sympathy is partial. Two human beings 
are like globes, whioh oan touoh only in a 
point, and whilst they remain in oontaot all 
other points of eaoh of the spheres are inert, 
their turn must also oome, and the longer a 
partioular union lasts the more energy of appe-
tenoy the parts not in union aoquire. 
---_.----
l7Emerson, "Experienoe," p. 271. ttl have learned 
that I oannot dispose of other people's faots, but I 
possess suoh a key to my own as persuades me, against all 
their denials, that they a.1so have a key to theirs." ' (Ibid.) 
l8Ibid., p. 270. 
One man's aotual knowledge, then, of any other man is as 
minute and transient as the globes whioh kiss at a pOint 
and rotate away. 
In further explanation of the Subjeotiveness of eaoh 
man, Emerson offers his ooncept of sin. As it appears in 
"Experienoe," the oonoept is m.ore detailed than the remark 
he made in his Journal. MSin is when a man trifles with 
himself, and is untrue to his own oonstitution. u19 
Sin in the sinner, Emerson claims, differs when it 
is Tiewed, first, by the sinner himself and, second, by 
an observer of the sinner. 20 For the sinner, his act 
is merely an "experiment." For the observer of the sinner, 
however, the aot remains the traditional evil it has always 
been. IVhy this disorepanoy exists, Emerson explains, is 
due to the point of view in each man. The sinner views 
sin from the intellect and, therefore, considers it a 
19Emerson, Journals, IX, 20. 
2°Emerson, "Experienoe," p. 270. "We believe in 
ourselves as we do not believe in others. We permit all 
things to ourselves, and that whioh we oall sin in others 
is experiment for us. tt (Ibid.) 
1'3 
14 
mere "diminution, 01" less", whereas, the observer of the sinner 
views the other man's sin from the oonsoience and, 8S a 
result, finds it "bad." It is, however, quite possible 
that either point of view might exist in either the sinner 
or the observer. The saint when be sins does not view his 
sin from the intellect. Rather, be views it from the conscienoe 
and, as can be expeoted, feels sad. Emerson feels thet sin 
viewed from It-the oonsoience, and not the intellect [!esults 
in a] confusion of thought;" and feels that this "confusion" 
provides an additional barrier between individual men and 
that the Subjeotiveness of eaoh individual is thereby 
increased. 21 One explanation links this matter with Emer-
son's status 8S a mystic. 22 
rlysticism denies the real 1 ty of "evil" in the 
conventional sense, and Emerson's interpreta-
tion was fundamentally that of the mystic. 
Of course neither mysticism nor Emerson denies 
the reality of what men call nevil" or the 
reality of the feelings of pain and sorrow 
which accompany ,the phenomenon of "evil" in 
21 Ibid., p .. 271. 
22Carpenter. pp. 14'-44. Carpente~ speaks of Emerson's 
personal attachment to the idea: "Emerson, himself, like 
all mystios, had lived through many long years of pain and 
tragedy and developed his philosophy as B. result •••• " (Ibid.) , 
individual human experience. But both deny 
the justioe of calling these "evil." They 
interpret "evil" from the point of view of God 
or of humanity as a whole, rather than from 
the point of view of the individual man suffer-
ing what he imagines to be evila the pain or 
death of the individual man of a nation may 
rather contribute to the development of human-
ity or of the life prooeas 8S a whole. The 
obvioua faot that it i8 diffiou1t for an indi-
'vidual to look upon hia own pain and death with 
godlike equanimity explains the unpopularity 
of the mystical interpretation of evil, but 
in no way invalidates it. 
For Emeraon, then, the problem of sin playa no small 
part in the relations of men. It is a barrier, a definite 
barrier, and does not admit of faoile oollapse: "For 
Emerson--8s the haunting overtones of 'Experienoe' intim-
. 
ate--it is a problem which can be optimistioa11y resolved 
only after the most desperate of inward struggles and only 
after attaining a serenity almost stripped of emotion. n2 '3 
Surface, another of the Lords of Life, Emerson views 
in t'!!O ways. He sees in it both evil and good. It is evil 
in that through Surfaoe no penetration to Reality, a fellow 
2'Robert E. Spiller, IJiterary Fisto;,;y of the United 
states, I (New York, 1948), 35~. -- ---
15 
Lord, can be realized. Not even grief, a major emotion, 
can ema.sculate Surfaoe: tiThe only thing grief haa taught 
me is to know how shallow it is. That, like all the rest, 
plays about the surface, and never introduces me into 
reality, for the contact with whioh we would even pay the 
costly price of sons and lovers. • •• I grieve that 
grief can teach me nothing, n.or carry me one step into 
real nature. n24 
But if Surface shoulders man away from reality and, 
as a result, hinders man's grasp of life, it nevertheless 
possesses, in Emerson's eyes, an element of positive 
worth: 25 
I compared notes with one of my friends who 
expects everything of the universe and is 
disa~pointed when anything is less than the 
best, and I found that I begin at the other 
24nmerson, "Experienoe, t. p. 256. Emerson speaks 
16 
of the grief he felt at the loss of his son: "Grief too will 
make us idealists. In the death of my son, nor more than two 
years ago, I seem to hRve lost a beautiful estate--no more, 
I cannot get it nearer to me. 1f (Ibid.) 
25 Ibid., pp. 262-26,. Emerson adds. "I aocept the 
danger ana-jangle of oontrary tendenoies. I find my acoount 
in sots and bores also. They give a reality to the circum-jaoent picture which suoh a vanishing meteorous appearance 
can ill spare. ft (Ibid.) 
extreme, expecting nothing, and am always 
full of thanks for the moderate goods. • • • 
If we will take the good we find, asking no 
questions, we shall have heaping measures. 
Tbe great gifts are not got by analysis. 
Everything good is on the bigbway. 
17 
Like its peer surfaoe, Illusion, another of tbe Lords, 
has the power to block man from Reality. "Oolor is illusion, 
you say, but how know I that the rook and the mountain are 
more real than its hue and gleam."26 
Illusion first hindered man when he oame to realize 
that he existed. This knowledge, olaims Emerson, oaused 
man's fall. For when man learned that he existed, he began 
immediately to distrust the knowledge disolosed by his 
intellect and by his senses. 27 No longer did man know 
with certitude that the objeots of his .nvironment actually 
26Bmerson, Journals, IX, 264. 
27Emerson, "Experience," p. 269. On the fall of man 
and his distrust of the senses. "It is very unhappy, but 
too late to be helped, the disoovery we have made that we 
exist. That disoovery is oal1ed the Fall of Man. Ever 
afterwards we suspect our instruments. We have learned that 
we do not see directly, but mediately, and that we have no 
means of correcting these colored and distcrting lenses whioh 
we are, or of oomputing the amount of their errors." (Ibid.) 
existed. He began to believe that all things were "sub-
jective phenomena" and mere "ehadows"s28 
The first illusion that is put upon us in the 
world is the amusing miscellany of colors, 
torms, and properties. Our education is through 
surfaoes and particulars. Nature masks under 
ostentations sub-divisions and ~anitold par-
ticulars the poverty ot her elements, and the 
rigid economy ot her rules. And, 8S infants 
are preoccupied wholly with surface differences, 
80 multitudes of adults remain in the infant 
or animal estate, and never see or know more. 
That Emerson, then, tound Illusions vexatious cannot be 
denied. His Journals, as well as his more popular essays, 
attest to that. But as to the exact extent ot his disturb-
18 
anoe with them, there is some doubts "This endless sequen.ce 
ot illusions, it it did not leave Emerson quite undisturbed, 
did not move him so deeply 8S perhaps it ought to have done. 
He tound the secret of this illusory energy of nature in 
necessity, the necessity for fa succession of moods or 
objects.·,,29 No &atter, though, the exact degree of effect 
28Emerson, Journals, X, 12,. 
29Charles Lowell Young, Emerson's Montaigne (New 
York, 1941), p. '5. 
Illusion had upon Emerson; its existence certainly aided 
the temporary reign that skepticism enjoyed. 
Temperament, another Lord of Life, should not be 
explained only in itself; for, when it is explained as one 
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portion of the oomplex of experienoe to whioh all of the 
Lords contribute, it serves to illumine their interrelations: 
"what is experienoe? • • • It is a series of illusions, 
governed much by temperament, 8S to their oharaoter in 
eaoh individual, and if deoeptive, yet eduoative. It is 
a movement through moments and surfaoes, wherefore it is 
wisdom to make the most of ever.y moment, to accept the 
condition temporarily existing and to live always with 
respeot to the present."30 
Temperament in itself, however, no lees than Illusion, 
deoreasee the tenability of oertitude and inoreases the 
30George Edward Woodberry, Ralph Waldo Emerson (New 
York, 1926), pp. 133-134. Ralph t. Rusk oalls attention 
to Emerson's method in this respeotl "What has been too 
muoh ignored is that his most charaoteristio ideas were 
deeply rooted in experienoe and were the fruits of the 
empirical method, which, as he believed, he never wholly 
abandoned." "Emerson and the stream of Experienoe," 
En~lish Journal, XLI! (April, 1953), 181-187. 
legitimacy of skepticism. It is especially vicious in its 
dealing with man inaofar as it greets him from the guise 
of other persona. strangers or friends provide no actual 
exception. T'emperament can manifest itself in anyone. 
"There is an optical illusion about every person we meet. 
In truth they are all oreatures of a given temperament, 
whioh will appear in a giv.en oharacter, whose boundaries 
they will never pass, but we look at them, they aeem alive, 
and we presume there ia impulae in them."'l 
Similar in effect to other Lords, Temperament clouds 
the 'intellect and attempts to brake all prop,resa toward 
Reality: "'T is a great misfortune'of certain tempera-
ments that they are by their own force or too muoh deter-
minaticn, thrown out of all sympathy, and are therefore, 
inoonvertible. • • • Arguments appeal to bystanders, to a 
,1Emerson, "Experience," p. 258. Emerson evidenoes 
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his disgust with youth in this matter. "We see young men 
who owe us a new world, so readily and lavishly they promise, 
but they never acquit the debt, they die young and dodge the 
acoount, or if they live they lose themselves in the orowd.'· (Ibid.) 
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world of bystanders, masses of opposing faot, all is wasted, 
tt is only oil to flame, only mountains of confirmation to 
their insanity.,·'2 Nevertheless, Emerson maintains that 
if it 1s used correctly, and if the faoulty of the reason 
(the exaot nature of which will be later discussed) 1s used 
to capacity, the intellect can and should, in no small 
measure, debilitate the prowess of the Temperament.'3 
The last of the llords, Suooes8ion'4 and Surprise, like 
Surface, are at once impedimentary andsdvantageous. They 
act as impediments in that they encourage the activity of 
,2Emerson, Journals, IX, 222. 
"A.J. Kloeomer, "Intellect and the Moral Sentiment 
in Eme1!"son t s Opinions on the Meaner Kinds of Men,·t American 
Literature, XXX (November, 1958), '22-,,8. Kloeckrier polnis 
out that in the essay "Experienoe" Emerson believed that the 
temperament was vulnerable to the faculty of the reason, he 
further asserts that Emerson lost this idea 8S time progressed. 
'4Emerson, Journals, V, 8,_ Emerson on the subject 
of SUccession: "Sucoession, division, parts, partioles--this 
is the oondition, this the tragedy of man. All things oohere 
and unite. Man studies the parts, strives to tear the part 
from its oonnexion, to magnify it, and make it a whole. He 
sides with the part against other parts; and fights for parts, 
fights for liea, and his whole mind beoomes an inflamed part, 
an amputated member, a wound, an offence." (Ibid.) 
Illusion; and th.ey serve as Advantages when, through their 
efforts, Illusion 1s made slightly more palatable than if 
Sucoession and Surprise did not exist. 
Suooession parades marching Illusions before tbe mind 
of man; yet it stifles the additional evil of ennuis 35 
The seoret of the illusoriness is in the necess-
ity of a suooession of moods or objects •••• 
This onward triok of nature is too strong for us. 
• • • When at night 1 look at the moon and stars, 
I seem stationary, and they to hurry. Our love 
of the real draws us to permanence, but health of 
body oonsists in circulation, and sanity of mind 
in variety or facility of aS80ciation. We need 
ohange of objeots. Dedication to one thought is 
quickly odious. 
Surprise, like Succe8sion, serves to promote variety 
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by allowing the ohance occurrenoe to upset the accepted order 
of knowledge that exists in, and often stultifies, man's 
world. "Cbemistry, astronomy, surprise all the time, and 
the appointed way of man from infanoy to omniscience is 
through an infinite series of pleasant surprisese"36 
3SEmeraon, "Experience," p. 259. 
36Emerson, Journals, IV, 123. 
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Surprise, too, oauses man to formulate a new order of 
knowledge that will prevail as aooeptable until the next 
Surprise ooours. stagnant design is, as a result, appre-
oiably avoided: nHow easily, if fate would suffer it, we 
might keep forever these beautiful limits, and adjust our-
selves, once for all, to the perfect calculations of the 
kingdom of known oause and effect. • • • But &hI presently 
comes a day, or it is only a half hour, with its angel whie-
pering,--whioh disoomfits the conolusions of nations and 
years. • • • Lite is a series of surprises, and would not be 
worth taking or keeping. it it were not .... 37 
The Lords of Life listed .and their prowess explained, 
Emerson, a"t the end of "Experience," registers a plea for 
an interpretation of life that, in addition to harboring 
the acoepted beliefs of society, will quarter the skeptioisms 
37Emerson, "Experience," p. 265. On SUrprise, 
Emerson addsl "Nature bates calculators, ber methods are 
saltatory and impulsive. Man lives by pulses, our organic 
movements are suoh' and the ohemical and ethereal agents 
are undulatory and alternate, and the mind goes antagon-
izing on, and never prospers but by fits. We thrive by 
casual ties [chance occurrence~. OUr ohief experienoes 
have been casual." (1!!!.) 
I 
Emerson ho1det'S 
In liberated moments we know that a new picture 
of life and duty is already possible, the elements 
already exist in many minds around you of a 
doctrine of life whioh shall transcend any written 
record we have. The new statement will comprise 
the skeptioisms 8S well as the faiths of society 
and out of unbeliefs a creed shall be formed. 
For skeptioisms are not gratuitous or lawless, 
but are limitations of the affirmative statement, 
and the new philosophy JRUst take them in and m.ske 
affirmations outside of them, just as much as it 
must inolude the oldest beliefs. 
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Skeptioism, then, at this junoture of his 11fe, remains 
for Emerson ~ very necessary and very valid conoept. It does 
not, however, remain so for long, 8S the ess~ "Monta1gne, 
or, !be Skeptio" reveals. 
,8 Ibid., pp. 268-269. Emerson notes his general oonoept 
of faitn-at this point. He speake of it in terms of aocepting 
the moral sentiment. the important thing is not so muoh what 
one believes conoerning the "immortality of the soul," but 
that one has experienoed the "universal impulse to believe." 
(Ibid.) 
CHAPTER III 
SKEPTICISM: " MONTAIGNE, OR, THE SKEPTIC" AND tfFArE1f 
The tone of Emersonian skepticism, as it is developed 
in ttr,~ontaigne, or, The Skeptic, ttl is, perhaps, best summar-
ized by two statements from the author's Journals. It should 
be remembered that the essay itself was written "in the latter 
balf of 1845",2 and that the first of these statements was 
recorded in August of 1845, the latter some nine years later--
in May of l854--when, supposedly, Emerson's skepticism had 
lMark Van Doren capsulized the relationship of Emerson 
to ~~ontaigne I Emerson tlloved Montaigne for that aspect of 
his skeptiCism which made him not so much a believer in 
nothing as a believer in all thin~s--an insatiable seeker 
after life in eaoh of its innumerable things • • • Montaigne 
gave Emerson a significant idealism." tlEmerson, Ralph Waldo," 
Diotiona~ of American Bio~ral~t ed. Allen Johnson and Dumas 
Malone, 1'New York, 19.,1, .,. 
2ihicher, Selections from Emerson, p. 493. Whicher 
points out that tt~ontaigneJ or, The Skeptic," written late 
in the year 1845, was first read in Boston on January 1, 
1846. It was given as part of a course that Emerson was 
teaohing. Preparation for the essay, Wh10her maintains, 
Emerson got from his reading of Cotton's translation of 
Montaigne. He stresses, however, that the doubts expressed 
in the essay are Emerson's own and not merely a reoording of 
Hontaigne's. <rill.) 
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spent itself. '!'he firsts "We expose our skepticism out 
of probity. Well, we meet, then, on the ground of probity, 
not of skepticism.'" 'l'he seoond: "We affirm and affirm, 
but neither you nor I know the value of what we say."4 The 
import here, then, is that Emerson believed that he met his 
environment with integrity and did with it what he oould, 
never knowing the actual signifioanoe of his aotions. '!"his, 
then, is the skeptioal tone ~f his mind. 5 
In tfMontaigne; or, The Skeptio" Emerson's acoomplish-
ment is threefold. Initially he charaoterizes the kinds of 
men who exist and cites their preoooupations. Seoondly, he 
bears witness to the emergenoe of the skeptic from the ranks 
of men. And thirdly, he oonstructs and, after much delibera-
tion, destroys through invooation of the moral sentiment, 
'Emerson, Journals, VIII, 8'. 
'Ibid., p. 466. 
5young, p. 26. "It is likely enough, or more than 
likely, that Montaigne had .erved rEmereon] in defining the 
skeptioal habit of mind or in formrng his own notion of that. 
But it is his own notion, l •• s complete than Montaigne's, 
whioh he sets forth • • • the doubts and negations are not 
~}ron taigne t s. They are tho se , rather, whioh Emerson had ga ther-
ed from his own thou~ht or experience, and wished to dispose of, 
assigning them to the skeptioal type of mind." (Ibid.) 
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the pavilion of thought upon which the skeptio stands. With 
this debunking, Emerson's flirtation with skepticism ceases, 
and he returns revitalized to his ooncept of ~od within man, 
his belief in the infinitude of the private man. 
How Emerson in the first plaoe became entangled with 
the skeptioism he eventually denounoes in the Montaigne essay 
is a prooes8 subjeot to 80me oonjeoture. One 'interpretation 
would have us believe that Emerson's ourtsy to skeptioism 
resulted from his wanting "to learn from the skeptios, the 
rationalists, and the scientists a common sense basis for 
moral truth. H6 Another view, however, appears to be more 
validl7 
Just as Emerson had personified his revolutionary 
ambitions in the hero-type of the soholar, so now 
he puts his doubts of the soholar's faith into the 
mouth of the skeptio. By thus oreating a fiotitious 
"alter ego" to whom to attribute his more dangerous 
thoughts, Emerson could relieve himself of respons-
6spiller, p. '62. 
7Wh1cher, Freedom and Fate, p. 11,. Whioher defines 
Emerson's skeptioism as-w& more than half-serious experi-
ment in a metaphysics of empiriciSM prompted by a bankruptoy 
of transoendentalism." (~., p. 114) 
ibility for them and yet at the same time give 
them expression. The doubts of the skeptio 
remain his own, however, detaohed, his skep-
ticism is his most oonsidered summary of his 
transcendentalism. The name he Rave it shows 
his continued faith, yet his conoern with it 
equally reveals the adjustment to faot that 
his faith was undergoing. 
The faot, then, that Emerson, if only for a transient 
moment, was gripped by an honest skeptioism is undeniable. 
It is interesting to note his workings with it. 
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When in the grip of his skeptio~sm, Emerson maintained 
that the majority of men reside in either of two categories. 
Man was either a genius or a man of mere talent. 8 If he 
was a genius, Emerson, at times, referred to him as an 
abstraotionist, if he was a man of mere talent, he was 
otherwise known as a materialist. Emerson often used varied 
8Ralph Waldo Emerson, ttJ.Hontaigne, or, The Skeptic, tf 
Selections from Ra1lh Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whioher 
~Boston, 19;7); p.84. Emerson offers this distinotion. 
"Eaoh man it! born with a predisposition to one or the other 
of these sides of nature. • •• One olass has the peroeption 
of differenoe, and is oonversant with faots and surfaoes, 
oities and persons, and the bringing oertain things to pass, 
--the men of talent and aotion. Another olass have the per-
oeption of identity, and are men of faith and philosophy, 
men of genius. tf 
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terms for the same subject interchangeably.9 
Of the nature of the ~enius,lO Emerson speaks frequently 
in his Journals. As early as 1824, the author records, 
"Profound knowledge is ~ood but profound genius is better, 
because • • • in the end, when both have arrived at the same 
amount of knowledge, the latter is much the riohest 1:SiC]7. 
They have not only a certain sum of intelligence to get, but 
a great expedition to perform."ll Again, as lat. as 1872,12 
9J • O• MoCormick, "Emerson's Theory of Human Greatness," 
New Enfl8nd Quarterly, XXVI (September, 1953), 291-314. 
MaCorm ck explains a familiar Emersonian tactio--the use of 
sundry synonyms. "Hero," "Great Man," and "Greatness" are 
all synonyms for "Genius. 1t Notes McCormiok, tlHe would leave 
more precise definitions to pedants." 
lOIbid. p. 296. On Emerson's oonoept of genius: ft ••• 
he [Emer80~ offers a definition 01 genius in very fine letter-
ing ••• genius is trueness of sight; • • • is the man Who 
can describe simply and with proper words the phenomena of 
natur .... 
llEmerson, Journals, I, 312. MoCormick (p. 298) 
adds that false genius is possessed by the individual the 
publio calls genius. that true genius is not made so by man, 
but by God; and that "all true genius is moral and humble." 
l2Emerson, Journals, X, 467. No exaot date is given, 
but the possible year span here i8 1862-1872. 
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Emerson speaks in this way about the same subjeots ~Genius 
delights in statements which are themselves true, which 
attack and wound any who oppose them."l' 
Tbe genius, then, is the man ot thought. He is the 
individual who 8ssails the Lords of Surfaoe and Illusion, 
pierces them, and comes to grips with the ideas of things. 
He is a man glued to the Infinite, the Absolute, the 
Real ,14 
Tbe genius is a genius by the first look he casts 
on any object. • • • In powerful moments, his thought 
has dissolved the works of art and nature into 
their causes, so that the works appear heavy and 
faulty. He has a conoeption of beauty which the 
sculptor oannot embody. Picture, statue, temple, 
railroad, steam engine, existed first in an 
artist's mind, without flaw, mistake, or friction, 
which impair the executed models. • • • It is not 
strange that these men, remembering what they 
have seen and hoped of ideas, should affirm dis-
dainfully the superiority of ideas. 
l'Ibid •• 
14Emerson, "Montaigne, or, The Skeptic," pp. 284-285. 
Emerson addsl "Having at some time seen that the happy soul 
will oarry all the arts in power, they [Geniuse!7 say, Why 
oumber ourselves with superfluous realizations? And like 
dreaming beggars they assume to speak and aot as if these 
values were already substantiated." (Ibid.) 
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Not only, however, is the genius the man of thought. 
He is also allied to the unified nature of nod in suoh way 
as to warrant prematurely some mention of his kinship with--
in some cases his identity with--the individual who is a 
practitioner of infinitude. In this respect, it has been 
noted that Emerson believed that "greatness of mind is 
to be evaluated in direct proportion to the strength of the 
idea of the Deity in the mind."15 Emerson oorroborates 
this idea in a letter to Thomas Carlyle. "Genius is but 
a large infusion of neity, and so brings a prerogative all 
its own • .,16 He oontinuesin this oorrespondenoe to oite 
the genius as the voice of the mind whioh speaks in the 
present and in the aotions of the future. 17 Later, however, 
the link between the praotitioner of infinitude and the 
l5vcoormiok, p. 293. 
l60harles Eliot Norton, The Oorrespondenoe of Thomas 
Carlyle ~ Ralph Waldo Emerson; II (Boston, 188~, ,'6. 
l7Ibid•• Emerson oontinuesl "It [peniu~ has a right 
and dutY to affront and amaze men by oarrying out its per-
oeptions defiantly, knowing well that time and fate will ver-
ify and explain what time and fate have through them said." 
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aotivator of the reason, the genius is most oases, shall be 
examined. Initially, the man of mere talent, or the mater-
ialist, must be examined. 
As the genius is oonoerned with the Infinite, the 
Absolute, and the Real, the man of mere talent, his oppos-
ite, enjoys dallianoe with only the Finite, the Relative, 
and the Apparent. This materialist finds both Surface and 
Illusion amiable assooiates, and he deems worthless the 
occupation of the -genius,IS 
The men of toil and trade and luxury,--the 
animal world, inoluding the animal in the phil-
osopher and poet • • • and the practical world 
• • • weigh heavily on the other side. The 
trade in our street believes in no metaphysioal 
causes • • • but stioks to cotton, sugar, wool, 
and salt. To the men of this world ••• the 
man of ideas appears out of his reason. They 
alone have reason • • • the inoonvenience of 
this thinking is that it runs into indifferent-
iSM and then into disgust. 
Emerson speaks in his Journals on at least three sep-
arate ocoasions of the nature of the primary tool of the 
ISEmerson, "MontaigneJ or, The Skeptic, f' pp. 285-
286. In'the Journals Emerson notes that even the man of 
talent has his inferiors: "Talent without charaoter is 
friskiness." (Jou.~al., V, 419) 
materialist, namely talent. On the first oooasion, he 
oonsiders taler.t in itself. "The talent BUoks the sub-
stanoe of the man. How often we repeat the disappointment 
of inferring general ability from oonspiouous partioular 
abili ty • • • • Blessed are those who have no talent. ,.19 
On the seoond and third oooRsions, Emerson oontrasts 
talent with genius, ,the latter, as might be expected, is 
thou~ht superior: "The differenoe between talent and 
genius is, that talent says things whioh he has never heard 
but oIloe, and genius things whioh he haa never heard.,,20 
"Genius i8 power, Talent i8 applioability. A human body, 
an animal, is an ap~lioability, the Life, the Soul is 
genius. H2l 
19n9., VIII, 95. 
20Ibid., VI, '70-'71. On the same point MoCormiok 
offers ?Urther oontrast. He notes, in addition to it. 
moral oast, the allianoe of genius with the Divine, he 
denounoes any suoh possibility with Talent, finding it 
merely "intelleotual good health." Talent, he believes, 
oan only glimpse the patterns of life that the genius 
oonsumes. (F. '01) 
21Emerson, Journals, VI, 371. 
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still held by the tenets of skeptioism, Emerson tests 
both the man of genius and the man of mere talent. He finds 
eaoh of them guilty of false dootrine; eaoh an extremistJ 
and eaoh the proponent of a rootless position. With regard 
to the man of mere talent. the materialist, this deoision 
oomes as no surprise. With regard to the genius. the deoision 
seems inoongruous only when one forgets the skeptical mood 
Emerson was in at this time. Onoe his skeptioism ebbs, 
Emerson returns to revere the genius 'as the indiVidual who 
most often exercises his right of infinitude. Nevertheless, 
the inoongruity of his attitude at this period in his life 
has been noted: ~More interesting, however, is his rejeotion 
of the materialist's opposite number, the abstraotionist. 
Emerson here takes a oommon sense view of the transoendental-
ist, the reformer, and men of faith generally.tt22 
From out of the skeptical confusion generated by the 
existenoe of the genius and the materialist, Emerson'. 
22Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 113. --~~~ --- ----
I' I 
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skeptio emerges. 2' He is neither a man of genius nor a man 
of talent, though he may well possess, in moderation, traits 
of either individual. He i8 pruned of excess and stands as 
the median of these t'RO extremes. "The abstraotionist and 
the materialist thus mutually exasperate eaoh other, and the 
scoffer expressing the worst of materialism, there arises a 
third party to ocoupy the middle gr~und between these two, 
the skeptio namely. He finds both wrong by being in extremes. 
• • • He sees the one-sidedness of these men of the street. 
• • • Neither will he be betrayed to a book and wrapped in 
a gown. The studious 01as8 are their own viotims, they are 
thin and pale, their feet are 001d."24 
2'Emerson, t'Montaigne; or, The Skeptic," p. 286. 
Emerson manifests his alienation from the abstractionists: 
"If you come near them and see what oonoeits they entertain, 
--they are abstractionists, and spend their days and nights 
in dreaming some dream, in expecting the homage of society 
to some precious soheme, built on a truth, but destitute of 
proportion in its presentiment, ••• of all energy of will 
in the schemer to embody and vitalize it.'· (Ibid., p. 287) 
-
24Ibid., p. 286. Emerson inveighs against the abstrao-
tionist-an! the materialists "You are both in extremes ••• 
You that will have all solid, and a world of pig-lead, deoeive 
yourselves grossly. You believe yourselves rooted and grounded 
on adamant; and yet, if we unoover the last facts of our know-
ledge, you are spinning like bubbles in a river • • • You are 
bottomed and oapped and wrapped in a gown." (Ibid., p. 287) 
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What Emerson believed at this time was that the skeptic 
knew what the genius denied, what the man of talent ignored: 
that man "cannot see.,,25 He believed that the skeptio riRhtly 
realized that his philosophical ability was not unlimited. 
And it must be stated here that had Emerson held this belief 
forever, had he been for the greater portion of his life a 
skeptic rather than a believer. and an optimist, bis theory of 
the infinitude of the private man would never have been form-
ulated. Nevertheless, Emerson was a 'skeptic for only a short 
period of time, during whioh he praised the skeptic for 
seeing that "conflicting evidenoes,,26 exist and for realizing 
rightfully that these conflioting evidenoes invalidate any 
adherenoe to a partioular oreed: ttl neither affirm nor deny. 
I stand here to try the oase • • • Why fanoy that you have all 
the truth in your keeping? 
25Ibid •• 
26Ibid •• 
There is muoh to say on all 
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sides.,,27 
Emerson adamantly maintained that the skeptic was not 
the iconoolast. The skeptio did not, as many would have it, 
shed for sheer pleasure the dogmas of anyone creed. The 
true skeptic did not flit from ohuroh to ohuroh orying 
"Liar I " Nor did he seek with probing fingers a side wound 
in all religion. What the skeptio did, Emerson asserted, 
was oonsider. "This then is the right groumd of the skeptic, 
unbelief, not at all of universal denying, nor of universal 
doubting, least of all of sooffing and profligate jeering 
at all that is stable and good. • • • He 1s the oons1derer. 
• • • Everything that is excellent in mankind, he will see 
and judge.,,28 
27Ibid•• Emerson oontinuesl "It there is not ground for 
a oandid thinker to make up bis mind, yea or nay,--why not sus-
pend judgment? I weary of these do~atizers. I tire of these 
haoks of routine. wbo deny the dogmas • • • • I am here to oon-
sider ••• to oonsider how it is. I will try to keep the bal-
anoe true. • • • Why think to shut up all things in your narrow 
ooop. when we know there are not one or two only, but ten, 
twenty. a thousand things, and unlike?" (Ibid., pp. 287-288) 
, -
28 Ibid., p. 289. Emerson elaborates on his philosophy of 
skeptioism. He notes that it must be both pliable and strict, 
pliable enough to fit man, and having fit him, strict enough 
to remain with him "as a shell must diotats the arohiteoture 
of a house founded on the sea." (Ibid.) 
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The true skeptic, Emerson believed, would remove him-
self, like Addison and Steele, from the traffic of society. 
would acquire lodging in the distanoe, and would, from this 
point of v~ntage, observe what actually is and what aotually 
is not. tlNot less clearly Emerson saw, and let his reader 
see, the distinguishing mark of skepticism: the suspended 
judgment, signifying that truth for the skeptio is still 
to seek.,,29 
There oan be little doubt that Emerson has established, 
despite an imminent denial of the same, a solid existenoe 
tor the position of the skeptio. For, by his rather exaot 
and defined defense of the oonsiderer in society, he makes 
exoeedingly difficult to acoept the sudden dismisl::&l of 
the skeptio through an 1n~ooation of a principle: that 
prinoiple which is the synthesis of ourrent that rides between 
29young, p. 20. Young cites Emerson's fa.ilure to 
inolude in his ooncept a 1:m~.3io terlet of skeptioism: tlBut 
there is a third element in the skeptioal attitude to life 
of whioh Emerson seems scarcely to have been aware • • • the 
alleged repose of mind, or complete tranquility, whioh 
follows suspension of judgment •••• n (Ibid., pp. 20-21) 
I 
the faculties of the reason and the moral sentiment, whioh 
is aotualized when the faoulty of the reason unites with 
~od, will be analyzed later in detail. 
'9 
How Emerson justified his destruotion of hie ooncept of 
skeptioism is 'Lb •. subjeot of varied opinion. 30 One inter-
pretation suggests that "Emerson had reservations about the 
philosophy of experienoe whioh he asoribed to the skeptio, 
for the skeptic is of course the traditional enemy of faith. 
SkepticiSM was a half-truth, it ignored the facta on which 
faitb was founded."'l Another critic asserts that "there 
wa$ not a fibre of soeptioism in his whole constitution. u32 
Should this last opinion be the truth of the matter, it 
makes nearly impossible any aooeptab1e explanation for the 
,Ospiller, It '61. Spiller explains Emerson's oonfliot 
with skepticism in terms of a battle. He believes that the 
"tone of penitential self-acousation" which grew in Emerson I. 
in his early years was deoimated ultimately by the "~ativ. 
optimism of his oharaoter." As a result of the trial, Spiller 
believes Emerson's affirmRtion was strengthened. 
'lWhioher, Freedom and E!!!, p. 112. 
'2woodberry, p. 107. Woodberry's argument holds that 
"Emerson W8S dominated above his will by a faith so pure, 
so absolute, so unque8tionin~ that he could hardly divide 
it from his consoiousness of being." 
sinoerity the essays on skeptioism evince. Emerson wrote 
too oonvinoing17 at that time in his life to be divoroed 
personally and oompletely from the philosophy he then 
preaohed. 
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One other explanation appears to be based on the most 
valid reasoning. It has as its oore the idea that, though 
initially gripped in the skeptioal vise, Emerson was even-
tually able to writhe frees "Yet Emerson was quite inoap-
able, none the les8, of maintaining the soeptioal attitude 
to life as anything permanent or final. or even of enter-
taining a doubt except in regard to partioulars. Faiths 
might go, but never faith. He was too inveterately affirm-
ative, in his habit of mind, ever to oome to rest in a 
soeptioal suspension of judgments, or to find any peaoe in 
the sceptio's peaoe."" 
It is possible, then, to aooept Emerson's resignation 
from the role of skeptio if one is willing to believe that 
the skeptioism explained and advooated in the e~says 
" 
Young, p. 18. 
! Ii 
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"Ciro1es," "Experienoe," 'f~~ontaigne, or, The Skeptio," and 
"Fate" is but a momentary lapse in what is otherwise an 
all-pervasive and oontinuous oonoept of Emersonian belief. 
Emerson's invooation of the moral sentiment would not lead 
one to believe otherwise. 34 
The final solution in whioh skeptioisM is lost, 
is in the moral sentiment, whioh never forfeits 
its supremaoy. All moods may be safely tried and 
their weight allowed to all objeotions, the moral 
sentiment as easily outweighs them all, 8S anyone 
•••• I play with a misoe1lany of faots, and take 
those superfioia1 views which we oall skeptioism, 
but I know that they will presently appear to me 
in that order whioh makes skeptioism impossible. 
A man of thought must feel the thought that is 
parent of the universe, that the masses of nature 
do undulate and flow. 
Over against Emersonts words, oritioa1 opinion exists 
that oannot accept as valid what it deems to be nothing 
more than the author's flippant rejeotion of skeptioism. 
41 
34Emerson, "Montaigne, or, The Skeptio," p. 300. Ii i 
In the Journa18 Emerson speaks in like manner. "Of the 
strange skepticism of the intellect. It will not speak to 
the intellectual on the platform of ethios, and that out of 
a true integrity. It has strange experienoe. It knows that 
it is a debtor to sin and degradation. Certainly let it do 
homage in si1enoe to the Soul. But in speeoh I think it 
should bravely, 8S it oertainly will with the Inte1leotua1, 
own the Actual. That is sublime--to abandon one's self, 
against all experienoe, to the Absolute and Good." (VII, 
296) 
"The refutation is brief. Too brief. Emerson took his 
stand on 'the moral sentiment,' as he liked to call it: 
and he simply held it against all the powers of negation 
or of doubt. • • • It disposes of skeptioism in far too 
summary a fashion."'5 
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The oonoept of thefaoulty of the moral sentiment, 
then, is all important in Emerson's skepticism; and, as 
shall be seen, it has no less importance in the author's 
theory of the infinitude of the private man. As stated 
earlier, the faoulty of the moral sentiment is simply the 
faoulty of the reason, actualized, the faculty of the reason 
aotualized 18 simply the union of that faculty with the 
Deity. This union of the reason and the Deity, as Emerson 
meant it, is not easy to conceptualize, one might 8ay, how-
ever, that the reason consumes the willing Deity, which in 
turn permeates the consumer for that period of time that 
the reason remains actualized. The nature of this process 
'5young, p. '6. Young maintains that Emerson's retut-
ation of skepticism "leaves, or seems to leave, the doubts 
whioh Emerson had so honestly recognized as not without 
reason just where it found them." 
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will be considered in the chapter on infinitude. What will 
be considered here is the product of the realized reason, 
the moral sentiment itself, which at once atrophies Emerson's 
skepticism and invigo~ates his infinitude theory. 36 A 
simplified version of its definition stresses its import-
anoel "Emerson came to describe the faculty whereby man 
might come to explore the realm of the spirit as the 'moral 
sentiment,' and most of his value judgments on men and 
experience depend ultimately upon the presence or absence 
of this faculty. It ia the capacity of human nature to 
discover the moral law by means of 1ntu1tion. H37 
The moral sentiment, however, is more than the per-
oeption of the moral law by intuition. True, the reason, 
8S Emerson would have it, intuita, rather than systematioally 
36Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 14. Whicher notes that 
the roots of the oonoept-o? ~moral sentiment are lodged in 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, that the moral sentiment was used 
against the thought of HobbesJ and that Emerson beoame aware 
of the moral sentiment through his reading in college of 
Dugald stewart, the Soottish realist. 
'7 Spiller, p. '70. 
i 
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approaches the moral law; but the moral sentiment does more 
than this, for it is "the voice of God in the soul."38 
Emerson states that he is "enlarged by the acoess of a great 
sentiment, of virtuous impulse"; that this sentiment is tithe 
direct inoome of God ••• 39 How this direct inoome affeots 
him; how it oomes when the reason is taut; and how it leaves 
when the reason is flabby has this explanation: "By this 
'union,' the Over-Soul not only fills but is the individual 
soul, just as tbe ooean tide fills and floods for a time 
the sballow brook flowing into it, and becomes one with it, 
and then retreats again, leaving the 'brook,' the individual 
"SWhioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 14. Whicher notes that i' 
"This benevolent notion iiiintTo Emerson • • • that con-
science was not to be explained naturally." Consoienoe was 
the miorophone of God, through it he spoke his law, and man, 
if he were true to his nature, followed it without hesitation. (n!!. ) 
., 
9 Emerson , Journals, V, 248. Carpenter adds that 
Emerson's oonsoienoe had Puritan roots and that Emerson 
transformed it into the faoulty of the moral sentiment. He 
then regarded it as productive of an "axiom of all human 
oonduot and psychology." (Carpenter, p. 199) Whicher 
writess "God was revealed in his own soul by the best ot 
all possible evidenoe, the direot experience of his own 
consciousness." (Whicher, Freedom and Fat., p. 33) 
------
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mind, with only a 'far-off memory. ,,,40 
How and why the moral sentiment departs once it is 
possessed will be considered in the discussion of the 
reason, but it is well to note here that the "moral sen-
timent could oertain.ly inspire, but to oonquer and prev8i1 
took more than ecstasy." For "to be a doer demRnds the 
knack, or charaoter, or magnetism or whatever personal 
foroe it is that gives one man ascendancy over another.,,4l 
As Emerson explains, "Whenever the moral sentiment is 
affirmed, it must be with dazzling courage. .18 long 8S 
it i8 oowardly insinuated, as with the wish to show that 
40Renry David Gray, Emer8on. A statement of New England 
Transoendentalisms8 Expressed In lbe PblloS0Enl ~Its ChIef 
mxP1nent (New York;-l95§), p. 5b7 ~ersonfs ver=3oUI; Imer-
son s God, is "the vast spiritual background of existence" in 
which all being unifies. Each man, because of the Over-Soul, 
beoomes a miorooosM of the universe, he has within him in 
miniature "all the 1aw8 and the meaning of the whole." 
William Peterfie1d Trent, et al, The Oambridge Histo~ of 
American Literature, I (New'fO'ik,-r9'17), '3'35. - . i 
41 Whicher, Freedom and Fate, p. 66. Perhaps more than 
the personal force of an1iidIVIaua1, his '·virtue of obedience" 
to the dictates of the moral sentiment guarantees hi8 success. 
C.E. Jorgenson, "Emerson's Paradise under the Shadow of Swords," 
Philological Quarterly. II (July, 1932), 274-292. 
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it is just wbat the Churoh reoeives today it is not imparted 
and oannot be owned. ,,42 
The moral sentiment has likewise been cited as the term 
whioh Emerson used most frequently .tto desoribe man t s rela .... 
tionship to the oentral faot of spiritual law."43 In this 
instanoe the moral sentiment is the "traditional weapon" 
Emerson used to oppose "the spiritually limiting effect 
of rationalism and empirioism ... 44 To some it appears that 
Emerson used this weapon legitimately in his expulsion of 
skeptioism. 45 Por others, however, doubts remains "Yet 
42Emerson, Journals, X, 102. "By lowly listening, 
omnisoienoe is for me. By faithful reoeiving, omnipotenoe 
is for me. But the way of the soul into its heaven is not 
to man, but from man." (Ibid,. V, 273) 
43X1oeokner, p. 323. George A. Gordon offers an inter-
pretation of the relationship: "The Emerson dootrine of man is 
as hard to define as the Emersonian dootrine of God, but if we 
say that God is the soul of the universe and that man is the 
soul that answers to it ••• we shall not be far astray." 
"Emerson as a Religious Influenoe," Atlantio Monthlx, XCI (May, 1903), 585. 
44Xloeokner, p. '2'. 
45Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 14. Emerson oonfirms 
Whioher's oontentions '·See ~many cities of refuge we have. 
Skepticism, and again Skeptioism? Well, let abyss open under 
abyss, they are all oontained and bottomed at last, and I 
have only to endure. I am here to be worked upont" (Journals, 
VII, 82) 
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in the moral sentiment 8S he conoeived it, there is the 
same sense of contact with an ultimate reality as in other 
forms of mystical experience, and the same sense of making 
the oontact direot1y, the same sense of immediaoy. To the 
skeptic, however, all mystioi8lll will seem to be, more than 
likely, only one more i11usion.,,46 
47 
The effect of Emerson's snub of skepticism is two-fold. 
If the essays devot.d to skepticism are considered in 
isolation, Emerson's flight to the moral sentiment ia 
inoongruous. If they are considered, aa they ahould be, 
as but one portion of the Emersonian body of thought, and 
aa an unorthodox portion aa well, Emerson's abrupt change 
ot loyalty from skepticism to the moral aentiment will be 
eaaily understood. Emerson could not remain the considerer. 
He had to return to hia faith, the great belief in the 
46young, pp. ,8-'9. In addition, Kloeckner pointa out 
that "It is doubtful whether the moral sentiment as con-
ceived and celebrated by Emerson was by itself sufficient 
to insure partioipation by all men in the good life •••• ft 
(Kloeckner, p. '28) Now, if this is the oase, Young's 
argument--that the moral sentiment is inoapable of slaying 
skeptioism--takes on weight. 
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Spirit of unity, the belief in the moral sentiment. 
In the essay "Fate"47 Emerson further debunks the 
skepticism he once, for a period of time, cherished and 
held. He again states that his refutation of the skeptioal 
attitude results from his belief in the moral sentiment 
or in what he sometimes terms the Beautiful Neoessity,48 
the Oneness of all. Prior to the reiteration, however, 
he discusses the nature of Fate. Essential to Emerson's 
47Ralph Waldo Emerson, "Fate," Selections from Ra!,8 
Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whioher (Boston, 195~p. • 
This essay bas been termed Emerson's "most complete ex-
pression of ••• discriminating optimism." "Fate" states 
the beliefs of "the pessimist in the strongest terms." It 
lists the forces 01 nature which assail man, the laws of 
nature that cannot be brought under supervision, and the 
inevitable tragedies that often oocur. Nevertheless, the 
"good man oonfronts the evil Fate" and wins. Samuel McChord 
Crothers, ¥jlph Waldo Emerson: How to Know Him (Indiana-
polis, 192 ,p. 24. - - - -
48Emerson, "Fate," p. 351. In the Journals, Emerson 
speaks of the Beautiful Necessity (the moral sentiment) 
and says that "any single faot considered by itself oon-
founds, misleads us. Let it lie awhile. It will find its 
plaoe, by and by. in God's ohain. If (V, 79) 
oonoept of Fate49 is the idea of limitations "No pictu!'-e 
of life can have any veraoity that does not admit the 
odious facts •••• The element runn.ing through' entire 
nature, which we popularly call Fate, is knOWll to us as 
limitation. Whatever limits us we oal1 Fate."50 'What-
ever stands in strong oPP08i tion to, arid far beyond the 
reaoh of the will is termed Fate. 51 Emerson advises that 
man must acoept, but not without protest, tla great deal 
as Fate. tt52 He suggests that "we are examples of Fate", 
49 
49Norton, II, 217: In a letter to Carlyle, Emerson 
wrote: "I scribble always a little •••• I did within a 
year ago or eighteen months write a ohapter on Fate, which 
• • • I hope to sand you in fair print. • • • Comfort your-
self • • • you will survive the reading, and will be a sure 
proof that the nut is not oracked." 
50berson, "Fate,'f p. 3'8. 
5lIt i8 of 80me interest to note one observation made 
upon Fatel ' "One of the ha:ppiest and most illuminating of 
Emerson's definitions is thisl -Fate is the limitation of 
power.'" Rudolph Schottlaender, "TWO Dionysiansl Emerson 
and Nietz8che," South Atlantio Quarterly, XXXIX (July, 1940), 
,,8. It would appear thit Fate unoontrolled would be 
80meth inp; le S8 than hap'PY, though admi t tedly "illuminating. ft 
52Emerpon, Journals, VII. 55'.5. Soon afternard, EmeI'scn 
remarked I "Fate, 'ate. Well, settle this theT"; the nobility 
of the sentiment is in resisting that or in accepting it." 
(~., p. 559) . 
that we "toss up a pebble and it falls tt , that even "the 
soaring of" our "mind and the magnanimity" we "indulge 
will fall. n5' 
The nature of the limitation imposed by Fate is a 
unique one. For it includes and permits the existence ot 
the freedom of the will within its bounds: "To hazard 
50 
the oontradiotion,--freedom is necessary. If you please 
to plant yourself on the side of Fate, and say, Fate is 
all J then we say, a part of Fate is' the freedom of man. It 54 
But the freedom is a strange one, when one considers 
"the power of Fate, the dynastic oppression of Submind"." 
"Ibid., VIII, 2'9. Here Emerson intimates his 
eventuaT'VIotory over Fate. "'But cannot we ride the 
horse which now throws us?" (Ibid.) 
54Emerson, "Fate, tt p. '40. In the t.Tournals, Emerson 
elaborates on the apparent contradiotion in the co-existence 
of freedom and Ji'atef "Our dootrine must begin with the neo-
essary and eternal, and discriminate Fate from the necessary. 
There is no limitation about the eternal. Thought, will, 
is co-eternal with the world. And as soon as intellect is 
awakened in man it shares so far of the eternity,--is of 
the maker, not of the made. ft (IX, 216) 
'5~., VIII, 406. 
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-Underlying all is the 'power of Fate, the dynastio oppres-
aion of Submind.' He r-Emerson:1 now accepts the plain faot 
that moat souls belong to the world of fate, or animal 
good. Their fixed determinations are the very means by 
which high nature works. 'Pr •• souls are rare, and evell in 
th.m inheres an old inertia which punishes, a8 it were, any 
fit of geniality."56 Certainly Emerson believes that free 
souls are rue; but, n .... el"'the1.s8, h. believe. that they 
are. 57 Their numbers oonsist of those individuals wbo, 
through the union of the reason and the Deity, exercise and 
maintain the faoulty of the moral sentiment. 
56Whioher, Preedom and Fate, p. 155. Prior to the 
statement noted, ihieher-aiys iEat Emerson's notion of 
fr.edom reA1l1ted from hi. "early submission to neceSSity," 
which caused him to yearn for liberty with a ferOCity 
that was "all the more intense for his underlying sense of 
ita impossibility." What Whicher believes is that Emerson's 
later extravagant optimism emerged from this "longing for 
freedom" and "the eventual realization of' 1t." (Ibid., p. 1') 
57Bmereon, Journals, VIII, '11. Emerson apeaks on 
the subject of :tree and pent souls. "Soula with a certain 
quantity of ligbt are in exce •• , and irrevocably belong 
to the moral 01a88. • •• Souls with 1 ••• light, it is chem-
ically impos.ible that these be moral • • • thes8 belong to 
the world of ~at •• • (Ibid.) 
I' 
To determine the manner in which the freedom of the 
will and Fate coexist is no diffioult projeot. Their 
ooexistenoe prevails onoe freedom of the will beoomes a 
fact in a man; for man, from that moment knows the nature 
of Pate and has, thereby, ample defense against its 
assault. The entire prooess is but one other ohannel 
through which man aohieves infinitude. "Reality rules 
destiny. They may well fear Fate who have any infirmity 
of habit and aim. But he Who rests on what is, and what 
he is, has B destiny above destiny, and can make mouths 
at fortune ... 58 
Man achieves freedom of the will by activating the 
"Power,,59 of the will, whose efforts can bring Fate to 
58Ibid., IX, 199. 
59Emerson, "Fate," p. 339. C.E. Jorgenson asserts 
52 
that Fate is "left a word" or defeated by the "oonformity" 
to Fate of the will (p. 284). Perhaps; but it would seem 
that the will would conform not to Fate itself, but to the 
law of the nei ty whioh Fate obscures. The "powert• of the 
will slays Fate, then conformity to the good ocours. Philip 
Lovelaoe Nicoloff concurs. ft ••• Emerson held that mere 
insight into the 'scientific' law and its utility was not 
enough. ~Man must also ",,-r,lve his assent to the law. The 
law Must beoome his will just 8S it was the will of the 
universal intellect." Emerson on Race and History (New 
York, 1961), pp. 98-99. -- ---- ---
its knees: ttThus we traoe Fate in matter, mind, and morals • 
• • • It is everywhere bound or limitation. But Fate has 
its lord, limitation its limits. • • • For though Fate 
is immense, so is Power, whioh is the other faot in the 
dual world, immense. If Fate follows and limits Power, 
Power attends and antagonizes Fate. • • • Man is not 
order of nature, saok and saok, belly and members • • • 
but a stupendous antagonism.,,60 
Power of the will comes into existence as a by-produot 
of the prooess of evolution whereby the faoulty of the 
reason promotes itself to the faculty of the moral sentiment. 
Once the faoulty of the moral sentiment evolves, the limit-
ations otherwise imposed by Fate 'Neaken, and, as a result, 
man prepares for a realization of his infinitude. Thought, 
the energy the reason gives off in this transformation, 
illustrates the new dominance: "Thought is identical, the 
oceanic one, which flows hither~nd thither, and sees that 
all are its offspring: it coins itself indifferently into 
house or inhabitant, into plants, or man, or fish, or oak 
6°Emerson, "Fate," p. "9. 
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or grain of sand. All are re-oonvertible into it. Every 
atom 1s saturated with it, and will oelebrate in its 
destiny the same lRwa.»6l 
Fate, then, as a result of the assault by the power 
of the w1l1, no longer harass •• Emerson with limitation. 
Rather, 1t begin8 to untold to him a greater knowledge 
of his personal powera: "The breath of the will whioh 
blew through the universe eternally in the direotion 0'1 
the right and necessary was now his will also, and betore 
it he moved irresistibly, fated to succeed. No longer 
driven by appetite a~inst the 'burning wall' ot Fate, 
he .ent forward to perform what he now kne. to be an 
absolute good. He acted knowingly 88 an instrument of 
the 4ivinity_M62 As an instrument of the divinity, 
Emerson, "trom identifying his real self with the divine 
6lEmerson, Journals, VIII, 56'. Earlier, in the 
Journals also, Emerson 8aid that "'hought is nothing but 
ihe oirculations made luminous. There "is no solitary 
tlower, and no solitary thought." (Ibid., p. '97) 
62Niooloff, p. 214. ~icoloft believee that skepticism 
never had an aotual hold on Emereon, but that with the hands 
of Fate it "stole what te" good hours 1t oould." As noted 
previously, Niooloff believes Emerson capable 0'1 pushing 
Fate aside in hie search tor the neity. (1!!!.) 
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Self within him and dismissin~ the rest as outer shell, 
temporary and apparent, • • • came to recognize that his 
real self was the whole contradictory nature, divine poten-
tiali ty and mortal limits together •• ,63 
This function, then, of the faoulty of the moral sen-
timent as a pivotal point in the interaction between the 
ooncept of skeptioism and the theory of the infinitude of 
the private man beoomes increasingly evident when various 
interpretations of the infinitude theory are brought under 
oonsideration. Similarly, a deeper impression of the 
nature of the moral sentiment itself ooours when its souroe, 
the faoulty of the reason, is oonsidered at length. Both 
examinations shall now begin. 
6'Whioher, Freedom and Fate,p. 1o,. On the S8me point 
Woodberry notes that "The sour-Knows itself 8S an effect of 
which the cause is ~od." He ssserts that Emerson believed 
that, in this instanoe, cause and effect were "consubstantial." 
Moreover, he defines Emerson's oonoept of the soul 908 "a 
partioular form of divine energy.u (P. 109) 
CHAPTER IV 
THE DOCTRI}i~ OF THE nJ.FINlTUDE OF THE PRIVATE I'lAN 
It is no easy task to determine with oertitude the 
exact meanin~ and purpose Emerson had when he, in his 
Journals, made the :1'ollowing statements: Uln all my 
leotures, I have taught one dootrine, namely, the in:1'in-
itude 0:1' the private man",l and "I a:1'firm the divinity of 
man.,,2 The latter statement, at :1'irst glanoe, might seem 
self-explanatory, but olose scrutiny 0:1' the author's work 
dismisses immediately any suoh possibility. 0:1' the 
IBmereon, Journals, V, 3S0. Any doubt that Emerson 
was not serious when uttering thie statement should be 
eradioated when the statements whioh follow it are read: 
"This the people aocept readily enough, and even with loud 
oommendation, as long as I oall the lecture Art. or Politics, 
or Literature, or the Household, but the moment I call it 
Religion, they are shocked, though it may be only the appli-
cation of the same truth whioh they receive everywhere else, 
to a new olass of facts." (Ibid., pp. 380-381) 
-
2 Ibid., VIII, 87. Again, Emerson writes, "Who shall 
de:1'ine~me an Individual? I behold with awe and delight 
many illustrations of the One Universal Mind. I see my'being 
imbedded in tt, as a plant in the earth so I grow in God. I 
am on.ly a form of him. He is the soul of me. I can even with 
a mountainous aspiring say, I am God •••• " (Ibid., IV, 247) 
Emerson has made, directly and-rnaIrectly, the same claim in 
other instances. 
56 
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diffioulty of the dootrine, the followin~ has been noted: 
"It is a diffioult dootrine, more nearly Christian than 
pagan, but striotly neither one nor the other. 
• • • It 
is a moment in that life whioh is at onoe human and divine. 
The infinitude of the private man is a dootrine whioh makes, 
or tends to make, the entire experienoe of life a religious 
• • • experienoe."3 
The oase for Emerson's status as a mystio is the topic 
of much debate. The opinions proferred on the plausibility 
of suoh olassifioation are as many as the definitions offered 
for the term itself. 4 One who believes that Emerson is a 
3 Young, p. 180. 
4Carpenter, pp. 113-114. In situating Emerson within 
its soope, Carpenter first sections mystioism into three 
areas. The first area consists of those who deal in the 
oocult for the sake of the oooult, i.e., the magioians or 
the mediums. In this sense, mysticism is Ita term of re-
proach." The seoond area inoludes those who claim them-
selves evidence of "the doctrine that God or the ultimate 
nature of reality ••• may be experienced or known in an 
immediate apprehension or insight , differing from all ordin-
ary sensation o-r ratiocination. tt Individuals who experienoe 
this kind of mysticism evinoe tfeostasy" in the supernat'l.lral. 
Carpenvr cl~ms that "Emerson did not describe the exper-
ienoe lPe had as radioally different, or supernatural, nor 
claim persona ly to have attained it in its pure supernatural 
form.'t For this reason, Carpenter says, Emerson has often 
been denied tIthe title of 'mystio.·" The last area of mystic-
ism, however, is Emerson's. Here reside those who hold that 
"any type of theory assertiBg the possibility of attaining 
I 
. , 
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mystic speaks in reference to the infinitude theory and 
says that "This idea of unity or identity results directly 
from the mystical experienoe of eostasy, in whioh the 
individual escapes the limits of his own individuality 
to feel himself part of the whole.·' 5 That suoh ecstasy 
would have to occur in anyone who experienced Emersonian 
infinitude seems proper to assumes "The doctrine of the 
infinitude of the private man was the point of agitation 
in his thought, the flame under the pot, beoause it irre-
sistibly suggested that the power newly disolosed within 
his soul might, now that it was at last recognized, be 
made to flood his whole being • 
knowledge or power through faith or spiritual insight .. is 
mysticism. "By this general definition," says Carpenter, 
"Emerson was clearly a mystio." In the present writer's 
opinion, however, Emerson's essays and Journals offer ample 
evidence of Emerson's residence in the second area as well 
as the third. 
5Ibid., p. 21. Carpenter notes that the soul, in 
ttidentifying itself with God ••• achieves that feeling of 
beatitude or unity which is the goal and reward of all 
mystics." (Ibid.) 
6Whicher, Freedom and Fate, pp. 46-47. On the same point 
McCormiok remarks that VEmersonts theory of human greatness 
plagued him all his life. If This doctrine, 1-'oCormick asserts, 
was the essence of Emerson's optimism. (P. 291) 
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From study there emerge three, if not more, possible 
interpretations of Emerson's theory of the infinitude of 
the private man. The first would hold, simply, that man 
as an individual is in himself God. The seoond would 
suggest that man as an individual is in himself, as is 
eaoh other man, one portion of a ~od Whom all men make 
manifest. The third would contend that man as an indi-
vidual is in himself potentially God, that he becomes 
truly G~d when he has nurtured and developed into aotual-
ity the God-potential that is, by his very nature, his. 
Eaoh of the arguments wears a garment of evidenoe. the 
fabric of the last, however, is of a finer, more intricate 
weave. 
Evidence in Emerson's work for the initial argument--
that man as an. individual is in himself God--follows a 
distinct pattern as does the oritioism that agrees with 
it: "The rook on which he ••• based his life was the 
knowledge<:that the soul of man does not merely, as had 
long been taught, contain a spark or drop or breath or 
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voice of God, it is flod. tt7 Emerson, in his own words, seems 
to agree: ttExcite the soul, and the weather and the town and 
your oondition in the world all disappear; the world itself 
loses its solidity, nothing remains but the soul and the 
Divine Presenoe in which it lives. u8 His assertion involves 
the idea that the individual is a resident in Divinity and, 
more importantly, that each man ultimately is the Divinity 
in which he resides. On the same issue he speaks again: 
H ••• that is one tact then, that in certain moments I have 
knqwn that I existed directly trom God, and am, as it were, 
his organ, and in my ultimate conscience am He. tt9 
7Whicher, Freedom ~ !!]!, p. 21. 
Baalph Waldo Emerson, ttDivini ty School Address,·' 
Selections from Ral~~ Waldo Emerson, ed. Stephen Whicher (Boston, 19;7J; p. • It might be noted that in this 
address Emerson spoke of the historical aspect of the 
infinitude doctrine. He attacked historical Christianity 
as the shaokles of religion. (Carpenter, p. 56) What he 
urged the Harvard graduates to do was to seek the new revel-
ation--the essence of their own natures. 
9Emerson, Journals, IV, 249. George Gordon notes 
Emerson's method of exciting the soul. ttMan is called upon to 
speak face to face with Go4 to allow the Divine Soul to awaken 
the dormant faculties within him, to educate his whole being 
in soience, in duty, and in worship." (P. 585) Woodberry des-
cribes the intuitive nature of the activity: ttThe :function of 
the soul with regard to this divine influx is to reoeive, ••• 
to give unimpeded way to the currents which stream through it.·· (P. Ill) 
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On each of these occasions, however, Emerson qualifies 
both the concept of the residence of man in Divinity and the 
idea of the simple existence of man as God. In the first 
instance, "'~xcite the soul" and in the second,"in certain 
moments"--these conditions, Emerson says, must first be 
satisfied before man is God. As such, the qualifying trios 
of words do not enhance the first argument. 
The second argument--that man as an individual is one 
portion of a God Whom all men make mani:fest-~also has in 
Emerson's work apparent evidenoe of its authenticity, "Like 
a bird whioh alights nowhere, but hops perpetually from 
bough to bough, is the Power whioh abides in no man and in 
no woman, but for a moment speaks from this one, and for 
another moment :from that one. nlO 
No one man, the~, acoording to this idea, is, or 
contains entirely in himself, God, because "there is no 
adaptation or universal applioability in men, but eaoh 
l°Emerson, "Experience," p. 261. 
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has his speoial tallent, and the mastery of sucoessful men 
consists in • • • keeping themselves where and when that 
turn shall be oftenest to be practioed. ttll The men who 
are popularly great, not essentially great, are what they 
are preoisely beoause they choose to join wills with, or 
open themselves to, not the Divine Spirit as they should 
but, rather, to other men who offer them the dubious reward 
of a transient feeling of greatness. l2 Nevertheless, some 
maintain that "the soul is identioal' in all men,tt that "its 
essence is divine."l, Others follow the same route to its 
llIbid., p. 260. The reader should not think that 
Emerson in this instance uses the term talent in the derog-
at~ry sense of the man of mere talent. The context from 
which this sentence was extracted has these thou~ht8 in close 
conjunctions "A man is like a bit of Labrador spar, whioh has 
no lustre as you turn it in your hand until you oome to a 
particular angle, then it shows deep and beautiful colors. • • 
Of course it needs the whole society to give the symmetry we 
seek." (~.) 
l2McCormick, p. '08. "The greatest man is not man at all 
for he merges his human will in the Divine and becomes the imag 
of Rod." (Ibid.) 
l'woodberry, p. 112. Earlier Woodberry observed that "the 
soul's knowledge of God, however, is not self-knowledge." He 
states that suoh lmowled~·of the Deity "is rather unfolded to 
human apprehension separately and diversely as knowledge of tha 
energy, not ourselves, which has self-existenoe for its ohief 
trait and is operant in and upon the soul, but above it ... 
(Ibid., p. 110) How all of this relates to a soul whose "ess-
ence is divine" (Ibi1., p. 112) is diffioult, this writer would 
imagine, to establish. 
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farthest extreme: pantheism. "This pervadin~ soul of the 
universe hallows the world, hallows humanity, fills nature 
with beauty, fills society with radiant meaning, and over-
whelms all finite forms, natural and human, with infinite 
life, light, significance, beauty, and joy.H14 
Additional support for this seoond argument emanates 
from Emerson's idea of the effeot of compensation15 upon 
the "double oonsoiousness" of mant 16 
One key, one solution to the mysteries of 
human oondition, ••• to the old knots of Fate, 
freedom, and foreknowledge exists: the pro-
pounding, namely, of the double oonsciousness. 
A man must ride alternately on the horses of his 
14 nordon, p. 585. On Emerson's attitude toward pan-
theism, Whioher remarks that "he is faoed with a choice 
between two varieties of pantheism." These are "pancosmism, 
the identification of God with the totality of things" and 
"acosmism, the denial of the reality of anything except God." 
Ultimately, Whioher says, Emerson Hin great part ••• avoided 
either one. tt (Freedom!!!!!! Fate, p. 31) 
l5'Noodberry, p. 129. "Emerson's name for this indiffer-
ency in circumstanoes is the law of compensation • • • • 
The divergence, the separation, the opposition, are only 
apparent; life is an integration of the two elements, and 
the law of compensation lies in the necessity of the inte-
gration. Man oannot have a part, but must take the whole 
••• the sweet [and] the bitter." (Ibid.) 
l6Emerson, ttFate,tt p. 351. 
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private and his public nature • • • • To offset 
the drag of temperL~ent and race, which pulls 
down, learn this lesson, namely, that by the 
cunning co-presence of two elements, which is 
throughout nature, whatever lames or paralyzes 
you draws in with it the divinity, in some form, 
to repay. 
64 
Man, therefore, according to the second argument, would 
be, in Emerson's eyes, other than pure Divinity. He would 
be more than a voice for the thoughts of a separate nod. 
He would be, in effect, "human", and, as such, he would be 
subjeot to frailty, compensation for whioh he could gain 
through a oomprehension and realization of the Divine por-
tion of his dual nature. As haa been noted, "For a few 
years , , • compensation played an indispensable part in 
furthering Emersonts emancipation from sceptioism and 
8elf~distrust' the assertiOn of a law of compensation is 
the first major offensive aotion in his private battle 
with Fate.,,17 
l7Whioher, Freedom and Fate, p. 37. Whioher opines 
that "The notion of an auiomitIC moral oompensation, never-
theless, is without question the most unacceptable of Emer-
son's truths, and a major cause of his present decline of 
reputation." (Ibid.) 
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As stated previously, neither of these initial argu-
ments adequately explains Emerson's statement on the infin-
itude of the private man. It is the third argument, if 
any, that brings lights Emerson believed that man was poten-
tially God, that he beoame God when he employed to capacity 
those personal powers of his nature that were geared to 
the fruition of each man's God-potential. 
The significanoe of Emerson's oonoept of Natura18 in 
l8Lauter pOints out why it is difficult to pin down 
Emerson's conoept of Naturel If ••• I think we may say that 
'in each use of ,'Nature' ••• Emerson means something complex, 
something of which we cannot know the full import until we 
have studied many ooourrenoes. For while the orbed meaning 
subsists in Emerson's mind at all times, only one or another 
aro is likely to appear clearly to us in any given instance." 
P. Lauter, 'trrruth and 'Nature. Emerson's Use of Two Complex 
Words,·t EntliSh Lite~ HistoH' XXVII (Maroh, 1960), 70. 
Another noe on the 81!1~lty 0 Emerson's "Nature lf is made 
by Carpenter. He states that in the essay Emerson sought 
"to express a new philosophy of life all at once, and it 
is not surprising that he failed. It The essay itself. Car-
penter says, "ohallenged attention if it evaded definition." 
(P. 52) If Lauter and Carpenter found ambiguities in "Nature," 
Thomas Carlyle did not. Emerson mailed him a copy of the 
essay, and Carlyle replieds "Your little azure-colored 'Na~e' 
gave me true satisfaction. I read it, and then lent it about 
to all my acquaintanoe that had a sense for such things. • • • 
You say it ,is the first ohapter of something reater. I call 
it rather the Foundation and Ground plan [sic on whioh you 
may build whatsoever of great and true has-oien given you to 
build.", (Norton, I, 112) 
I 
I
i! 
II I,,! 
'I 
, I I 
66 
relation to the theory of the infinitude of the private man 
is not easily pinpointed. Even in isolation, the Emersonian 
ccmoept of Nature as depioted in "Na.ture" ~l.1arantees no 
faoile explanation. Nevertheless, its value has not been 
underestimated: tiThe primary assumption of this essay is 
that man, when regarded individually or generioa1ly, is the 
starting point of all philosophical speou1ation. His func-
tiona, his relations, and his destiny are its only oonoerns. 
• • • Whatever truth lies beyond or outside man can be 
reaohed only through him and by him.,,19 
In the majority of his moments, Emerson viewed Nature 
as a positive good, in the minority--name1y, in his da1lianoe 
with skepticiam--he found Nature inimical. It is easier, 
in reference to the infinitude theory, to explain the former 
rather than the latter view, though both oan be explained. 
Ultimately, however, it must be remembered that no matter 
the strength of Emerson's outlook at a given moment, the 
following always, in one way or another, prevailed, ftNature 
19 Spiller, p. '369. 
fl 
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is tWO-headed. Invoked, or uninvoked, God will be there.,,20 
When Emerson viewed Nature 8S a positive good, he held 
that its physioal properties--the wooded area, the solitude 
afforded therein, the flower, the resident beauty--that 
these properties formed a "proj eotion of God, t.2l an "expos-
i tion of the Divine Mind. ,,22 He believed that ·'benefi t 
is the end of natur.u ,2, that "air, water, sun and moon, 
stone, plant, animal, man, devil, disease, poison, war, 
20 Emerson, Journals, V, 2'8. J.W. Beach attacks 
Emerson for invariably viewing "Nature all too blandly 
throu~h the ~es ot the 'mind,' reading it in the light .t 
'innate ideas' and all hoary preconoeptions ot 'idealism.'" 
He berates Emerson. tor not admittin~ that his mind may have 
"something to learn from Nature, from the world whioh it 
finds given to it from without • ., "Emerson and Evolution," 
Universitl ~ Toronto Quarterly, III (July, 19'4), 474-97. 
21Emerson, Journals, IV, 76. 
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22Ibid •• Spiller notes the distinotion Emerson made . 
between the man and Nature and how the latter relates to II 
Divinity. He does 80 in terms of Emerson's Me and the Not 
Mel "The Me is consciousness, or that part of man which 
partake8 of divinity, the Not Ve is the objective ot con-
sciousness, that with whioh the Me is in relation. But 
Nature, or the Not Me, also partakes of divinity. • •• Its 
reality lies in its being 'a projection of God in the un-
oonscious.'" (I, ,69) 
2' , Emerson, Journals, V, 28. 
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vioe.,24_-that these "all serve ... 25 He believed, in essenoe, 
that nature served man in all respeots: UReally the soul 
i8 near thing8, beoause it is the oenter of the universe, 
so that astronomy and ~ature and Theology date from where 
the observer stands. There is no quality in Nature's 
vast magazines he oannot touoh; no truth in soienoe he 
oannot see; no aot in will he oannot verif'y,--there is 
where he stands.,,26 
Emerson believed that "the relation of' the soul to 
Nature[was]parallel to its relation to God, in that there 
[was~ identity between the two and also operation of one 
upon the other ~d that] the funotion of nature [jas] to 
unfold the soul i:whioh it aooomplishe~ by virtue of the 
24Ibid•• Again Emerson, in the Journal., makes evident 
his amazement at'the multiplioity of' existence and, what he 
implies in this instanoe but ultimately recants, its indeoi-
pherability. "Just 88 man 1s oonscious of' the law of' ve/(e-
table and animal nature, so he 1s aware of an Intelleot which 
overhangs his oonsoiousness 11ke 8 sky, of de~ee above degree; 
and heaven within heaven. ~umber is lost in it. Millions of 
observers could not suffice to write its first law." (VI!I, 
567) 
25Ibid., V, 28. 
26Ibid., VI!I, 22. 
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perfeot oorrespondence of Nature to the soul.,,27 When in 
this mood, Emerson held that God and Nature were merely 
two aspeots of a single spirit,28 and that at times this 
single spirit was diffioult to disoern, as Nature was "in 
oontinual flux ••• 29 
69 
That Emerson did not always oonsider Nature a magnif-
ioent oornuoopia haa already been seen in the disoussion 
on skeptioism. When he believed Nature to be other than 
omni-benefioial, he found that it sealed man in an envelope 
ef distraotions, and that these distractions tended t. 
27 Woodberry, p. 11'. Emerson adds, ~But it is the Life, 
it is the incoming of God by whioh that Individual exists. 
• • • When that Divine Life shall have more riohly entered 
and shed itself abroad in him, he will no longer plead for 
Life, he will live." (Journals, V, 497) 
28Trent, p. '48. In addition, Spiller notes the trans-
cendental "idealistic view of the universe as an embodiment of 
a single oosmio pw,yohe, now manifesting itself as man, now as 
nature, and aohieving through the interaotion of the two in 
history its own secret intent •••• " Man, in this instanoe, 
would be but a fragment of the world psyohe. (I, 350) 
29Emerson, Journals, V, 377. How Emerson beoame immune 
to the unprediotable ?IUx of Nature he notes in his Journals 
when he states that the "detaohed faot is ugly. Replace it 
in its series of oause and effeot and it is beautiful. Putre-
faotion is loathsome; but putrefaction seen as a step in the 
circle of Nature, pleases." (~., p. 54) 
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obstruct any advance man mi~ht make toward a realization of 
his Divinity. In his skeptical period, Emerson dubbed this 
role of Nature as oppressor "Fate" and discussed it at great 
length, 88 we have seen, in an essay by the same name. 
For man to realize his quest, i.e., a knowledge of his 
divinity or infinitude, he had to learn, Emerson believed, 
the nature and structure of the hierarohy of his powers 
and had to aocede to its plan by convincing his faculty of 
the understanding that its province was not one of inter-
ferenoe with the functions of the faculty of the reason. 
The reason had its prerogatives, and the understanding had 
to subordinate itself to them. Emerson had this idea of 
rank in mind when he states that "Heaven is the exercise of 
the faculties •••• .,30 There 1s no question that for 
Emerson this exercise would constitute heaven, but the 
exercise would have to be a proper one geared to the plan 
the faculties, by their very nature, dictate. 
'0 Ibid., VIII, 571. 
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Prior to any intimate discussion of Emerson's concept 
of the reason and the understanding, and the function of 
each in man's quest to realize his infinitude, it would 
seem proper to give some mention to (though it is not in 
the province of this paper to discuss at great length) the 
historical sources--the people and the thoughts--that fed 
Emerson's mind with regard to each faculty. It is, of 
oourse, no great revelation to state that the individuals 
cited as influential in Emerson's personal idea of the 
reason and the understanding were influential also in the 
formation of other of Emerson's beliefs and tenets. 
In what is admittedly an oversimplification, it may 
be asserted that the roots of Emerson's ooncept of the fao-
ulties of the reason and the understanding were hooked in 
the soil of German Romantioism; that their stems, prior to 
their flowering in Emerson's mind, were bent somewhat in the 
wind of English Romantioism. In short, German thought passed 
through English minds before halting in Emerson. The roots 
themselves, mostly German and always Nordio, ares Kant, 
GOethe,3~chleiermacher, Fichte, Schelling, Sohiller, 
31Trent, I, ;;2. MoCormick observes that after 18;6 
Emerson's appraisal of Goethe was ~e~erally positive. Emerson 
"recoA'Ilizes the pervasiveness of Goethe's influence and he 
can write in 18;7 that Goethe has affected all reoent works 
I
I, 
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Leibniz, Hegel,32 Richter,33 Swedenborg,34 and Spinoza. 35 
The English Remantics of influenoe, in the main, are: 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Carlyle,36 with the latter two 
the most influential. Other influences, from a variety 
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of genius, because no young man can read Goethe 'without 
finding that his own compositions are immediately modified 
by his new knowledge.'tI (Fp. 296-297) 
32Rene Wellek, "Emerson and tle;rman Philosophy, ,. New 
England Quarterli' XVI (1943), 54. "The TranscendentiI'Ists 
were merely look ng for corroboration of their faith. They 
found it in Germany, but ultimately they did not need this 
confirmation. Their faith was deeply rooted in their minds 
and their own spiritual ancestry. n (~., p. 62) 
33Edwin D. Mead, "Emerson and Carlyle,1f The Influence 
of Emerson (Boston, 1903), p. 220. Mead notes that Emerson 
contaoted Richter's thought through Carlyle. (Ibid.) 
34Clarence Hotson, "Emerson and the Swedenborgians,tf 
Studies in PhilolOgy, XXVII (July, 1930), 545. Hotson 
observes~hat Emerson made at least sixty allusions in his 
Journals, oorrespondenoe, and published works to Swedenborg 
and his disoiples. (Ibid.) Van Doren oites Swedenborg as 
the source of Emerson~etaphY8ioal approaoh to nature, of 
his diffioulty with the oonneotion between the mind of man 
and the phenomena of nature, and of man's position at the 
oellter of nature. (F. 135) 
35wellek, p. 53. 
36Trent, I, 332. Edwin Mead adds that Emerson, in 1833, 
the year after his resignation from the ministry, visited 
Carlyl., whom he had been reading for five years. (F. 164) 
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of areas, have also been noted,37 and there is every like-
lihood that many of these bear the same relationship to 
~erman thou~ht as they bear to Emersonian doctrine. 
Emerson, then, for the most part, used the English 
Romantics as filters for Germanic thought. Coleridge is 
primary in this regard, especially as to the distinction 
between the reason and the understanding, and shall be later 
discussed. Wordsworth and Carlyle, though not as influen-
tial with regard to the concepts of the reason and under-
standing , were nevertheless of influence on Emerson and 
helped bring to fruition many of his ideas. A helpful 
comparison of the thought at Wordsworth and Emerson'8 
perhaps capsulizes their similarity and difference in 
these . statements: nPor each of them, God ••• penetrates 
'7YcCormiok, p. 301. McCormick includes "Gerando's 
colleotion of pre-Platonic philosophers; the neo-Platonics; 
a moral theism from Thales and Anaximander; a statement of 
the unreliability of the senses from Xenophanes; concept of 
unity from Pythagoras, of unity in the midst of diversity 
from Heraclitus." (Ibid.) F.I. Carpenter, in turn, asserts 
that "perhaps the mo~mportant and certainly the most 
unusual influence on Emerson ••• was the literature and 
philosophy of the ancient East... (pp. 110-111) 
38John Brooks Mo,,~e, "Emerson on Wordsworth, tf PT,rJA, 
XI,I (March, 1926), 179-192. 
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and interpenetrates nature, an Essence everpresent. Emerson, 
from the first, adds that this soul is not simply ever present 
--it is already within us, as well.,,39 
Carlyle was an important influence ~n several ways. 
He interpreted for Emerson, though to a lesser degree than 
did Coleridge, the ideas of Yant. 40 He held, as did Emer-
son in his period of skeptioism, a fluctuating concept of 
GOd,41_-fluctuating, that is, between the concepts of a 
'39Ibid ., p. 191. 
40carpenter, p. 224. Carpenter comments .that Emerson 
"adopted the transoendental terminology of Coleridge and 
Kant to describe as 'reason' what was essentially 'oon-
scienoe' guided by religious intuition." (Ibid., p. 198) 
Rene i,Vellek adds that "Emerson thought of Kant 8S the origin-
ator of intuitionism, but was mainly interested in his 
philosophy." (P. 46) A.J. Kloeckner, in turn; points out 
that Emerson, throughout his work, no matter his love of 
intuition, many times said that he "could not unequivocally 
rel,. on intuitions or first thoughts." (P. 327) 
41Henry E.J. Bevan, "The Religion and Philosophy of 
Thomas Carlyle," Transactions of the ROfal Society of Lit-
erature, XXVI (1905), 22'. As-aiffrcUl as it is to-system-
atize Emerson's thought, Carlyle's is no less 8 challenges 
"It has been said that you oannot reduce Carlyle to a system, 
and that is true. His teaohing is usually antithetioal. At 
one moment he argues violently for black, at another for white, 
and he leaves you to reconcile the two pOSitions as best you 
may." (Ibid., p. 212) Bevan could easily have been speaking 
of Emerson-In this instance. 
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personal and an impersonal Being. More importantly, Carlyle 
brought Emerson to Goethe, as Coleridge brought Emerson to 
Kant; and he ur~ed, and was suooessful in bringing Emerson 
to a perusal of some fifty-five volumes of Goethe!s work. 42 
Finally, in 1838, Emerson oollected, wrote an introduction 
to, and had published in America the essays of Carlyle, who, 
in turn, prefaced and had published in England Emerson's 
first volume of essays.43 
De8pite the general acceptance of the idea that Emer-
son's Germanic influenoe sieved through English minds, the 
possibility of his obtaining the same at its origin, in 
some cases, has been noted. Emerson owned a copy of an 
1838 translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, in the 
}f"'rancis Haywood translation, which is ··still preserved in 
his library at Concord ~nd] shows pehcil markings" that 
42 Mead, p. 224. 
4'Ibid., pp. 181-185. Edwin ?~"'ead believes that "the 
editing of 'Sartor Resartus t and Carlyle's Essays may be 
regarded as the beginning o'f Emerson's own literary career." (Ibid., p. 184) Carpenter notes the unique friendship between 
tne-iwo. They bickered about a number of things but were 
steadfast friends. Whereas Carlyle gave Emerson inspira-
tion, Emerson supplied two of Ca.rlyle' s ~reate8t needs: 
admiration and faith. Their friendship, strangely, thrived 
on the air of disagreement. (pp. 25-27) 
76 
Emerson is believed to have put there. 44 Nevertheless, 
it is believed that Emerson "learned from Coleridge Kant's 
distinotion of Reason from 'Understanding" and that Emerson's 
ooncept of the same is really "Kant • • • as misunderstood 
by Coleridge.,,45 What Emerson has done to the Coleridgean 
distillation of Kant i8 little better: "Emerson grows 
partioularly reokless when eohoing Coleridge's distinction 
between understanding and reason, whioh he handles with a 
looseness going far beyond anything possible to Coleridge. 
He has been muoh impressed with Coleridge's derivation of 
, II 
understanding from the mere senses, whioh makes it unreliable I'·, 
and inferior.,,46 
44 Wellek, pp. 44-45. 
45 Ibid., p. 47. Robert Spiller a.dvises tha.t Emerson "in 
his own-eaFly thinking • • • did not clearly distinguish bet-
ween the logical and the intuitive roads to truth." He says 
that Emerson owed to Coleridge this distinction but that tlit 
was not to beoome clear to him until his spirit had been I I 
melted and forged." (I, ,62) 
46Joseph W. 'Beaoh, The Conoept of 11ature in Nineteenth 
Cent~ Poetry (New vork;-r9~6), p. ;19. Beacn-assertsthat 
while ~erson "sometimes misses the metaphysioal implications" 
of the thou~hts he derives from Colerid~e, he reaches the same 
praotical result as Coleridge--Ita spiritual anthropomorphism 
in the interpretation o~ scientifio&ta, a disposition not so 
much to be guided by the facts in building up theories, as to 
read a human (and religious) meaning into the facts." (Ibid., 
p. '26) '" -
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Other Kantian concepts tha.t Emerson received in 
vitiated form were "the Kantian proofs of immortality, the 
existence of ~od, • • • the freedom of the will • • • 
and the subjectivity of time and apace ... 47 ~~any of these 
he doubtless received from his reading of Coleridge: 
"He was reading Coleridge's Aids to Reflection and Priend 
. ~--
in 1829--8 year before discovering Carlyle--and for the 
next seven years Coleridge remained perhaps the most impor-
tant single influenoe on his litera~ life. n48 
That Coleridge influenoed Emerson, then, in the Kant-
ian concepts of the reason and the understanding is cer-
tain, eve11 though the precise extent of such influence is 
impossible to ascertain. For "There can be little doubt 
that Coleridge introduoed Emerson to the terms 'reason' 
and 'understanding' as he used them in the technioal 
senses ••• and that coleridge fixed the distinotion 
47wellek, p. 47. 
48Carpenter, pp. 223-224. 
II 
between them in his mind. n49 It is, therefore, important 
to understand the nature of thought in this area that 
Coleridge gave Emerson, since the latter's concept of 
the reason and the understanding bears so heavily upon 
his theory of the infini t'lde of the private man. 
Coleridge believed that the faculty of the reason 
existed only in man; that the u~derstanding existed both 
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in man and in. animal s (in which case the understanding was 
termed "instinct"), that reason, by its nature, was super-
ior to understanding; and that for it to function properly, 
the reason had first to come to a realization of its im!:1en.se 
powers. 50 Once such powers were realized, the reason became 
49"~.R. Davis, "Emerson's 'Reason' and the Scottish Phil-
osophers," !',;ew En~la:nd Quarter1!, XVII (June, 1944), 211-212. 
Robert Spiller ad s on tne dist nction: "Similarly the dis-
tinction found in Coleridge and Emerson alike, between the 
Resson and the Understanding • • • could express and justify 
the TrBnscendentalist~ desire to retain both the mysticism 
of the 'past and the empirioism of the present, and to assign 
eaoh a sphere in experience proper to its character." (P. 350) 
F.T. Thompson adds that after "having established the dis-
tinction between the Understanding and the Reason, Emerson 
proceeds to show first the function of the Understanding in 
the discipline of the mind, and second the funotion of the 
Reason in the moral realm." "Emerson's Indebtedness to 
Coleridge," Studies in PhilolOgy, XXIII (January, 1926), 68. 
50Charles Richard Sanders, Coleridge and the Broad Churoh 
Movement (Durham, N.C., 1942), p. 35. ------
!I 
79 
the operative means by whioh man came to study spiritual 
truth; with suoh powers unrealized, any efforts by the 
reason in this area proved futile. lfuether, however, the 
reason ever beca~e operative by this act of faith in it-
self had no bearing on the prese!loe or absence of the 
faculty itself in every man. 5l It always existed in man, 
whether in a state of activated certainty or complete pass-
ivity. 
The understanding, as a faoulty in man, Coleridge 
thought impaired as its utility was debilitated by its 
inability to disoern spiritual truths the understanding 
oould deteot only material evidenoe and could not, as 
could the reason, deal perceptively with spiritual truth. 
The understanding, however, was not a oompletely inutile 
faoulty; it supplemented the reason in ita work whioh, to 
be acoomplished, required the oooperation of all of the 
faoulties of man. 52 
The reason itself Coleridge believed to be of two 
5lIbid •• 
-
52samuel Taylor Coleridp.:e, "The Friend," The com~lete 
Works of Samuel Taylor COlerid,a, ad. #.n.T. Snead, I (New 
fork, TS84), 164--8S cited in bid., p. 43. 
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types: the speculative reason and the practical reason. 53 
The goal of speculative reason was abstract truth; the 
goal of practical reason was the moral truth and will of 
man. 54 While not oblivious to the value of the speculative 
reason, Coleridge found the practical reason to be of more 
worth to man in that it provided him with a mean of ~idance 
according to which he might, rightfully, deterInine the 
course of his life. 
In summary, it may be said that Colerid~e held to be 
true three basic tenets of belief regarding the faculty of 
the reasonr that the reason revealed to mar the Highest 
Truth, rrod; that it revealed to him a knowledge of the 
basic unity in God of all proximate truths; and that it 
provided man with the ability to realize the importance 
Ultimate Truth must have upon the application and direc-
tion of his life. 55 This faculty of the reason existed 
in every man, supplemented in its work by the more mundane 
5'3Samuel Taylor Coleridge, "Aids to Reflection," in 
Shedd, II, 241-42, as cited in Ibid., p. 47. 
54 Sanders, p. 47. 
55 Ibid., p. 48. 
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faculty of the understarding. 
An apparent paradox that is common to both Coleridge 
and Emerson in their individual concepts of the reason 
and the understanding is the nature they asoribe to eaoh. 
The faculty of the reason, for them, has not the char-
aoteristics ordinarily predioated of it. And neither has 
the faoulty of the understanding. Coleridge and Emerson 
both believe that the reason is an intuitive faculty and 
the understanding a logioal one. 56 The ordinary concep-
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tions of these faoulties, of course, is just the reverse. 
Knowledge sweeps easily, like a tot on a waxed slide, 
into the properly oonditioned reason; it resists the under-
standing and, as with the stray crumb and the assiduous 
ant, must be dragRed away by the faoulty which seeks it. 
Davis provides a orystallized oomparison of the two 
faoulties: 
56spiller, p. 354. Spiller continues: "The third 
assumption ••• is that intuition and imA~ination offer 
a surer road to truth than abstraot logic or scientifio 
method. It is a corollary to their belief that nature 
is organio, and oorresponds to the teohnioal distinction 
between the reason as intuition and the understanding as 
logical analysis. 1t (Ibid.) 
I] 
The reason is here represented as a faculty of 
the mind that functions by revealing or per-
c,eiving intuitively and not by a syllogistic 
or lo~ical process of reasoning. It is eternal 
or farsighted, and gives to man his 'first 
thoughts' of youth, his love of the beautiful 
and the good • • •• The understanding, on the 
other hand, is a faculty of the mind that 
functions by comparing, contriving, adding, 
and arguing. It is tempQra1 and near-sighted, 
denies the assertions of reason, oold gives to 
man rules of custom and self-interest fO~7the 
care of the body and animal life • • • • 
Emerson's version of the distinction provided by 
82 
Coleridge between the reason and the understanding is similar 
to the distinction itself in a number of ways.58 Each argues 
that "the Understanding belongs to the mass" and that ttit is 
the faculty which ••• arranges phenomena." Each believes 
that, in the active sense, which is, for Emerson, its 
existence as the faculty of the moral sentiment, "the 
Reason is possessed only by a few" and that it uis necessary 
57navis, pp. 210-211. In the sermon "The GenUUle 
Man," Emerson contended that "there is this supreme uni-
versal reason in your mind which is not yours or mine or 
any man's, but it is the spirit of God in us all." A.C. 
Mcfliffert, ed., Young Emerson Speaks C:ew Vork, 19'38), 
p. 186. 
58 MoCormick, p. 299. 
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for the intuition of the ultimate ends.,,59 Emerson, in 
his tTournRls, elaborq,tes: If The City delights the Under-
standing. It is made up of finitiesl short, sharp mathe-
matical lines, all calculable. It is full of varieties, 
of successions, of oontrivanoes. The Country, on the 
contrary, offers an unbroken horizon • • • of vast un.iform 
plains, of distant mountains • • • the objeots of the road 
are few • • • the eye is invited ever to the horizon and 
the clouds • • • • It is the school of the Reason.,.60 
Coleridge did not believe--and Emerson agreed with 
him--that the faoulty of the understanding was devoid of 
value. Coleridge stressed the true funotion of the under-
standings its ability to serve the reason in subordination, 
59Ibid•• In the Journals, Emerson typifies his con-
oept of~ funotion of the reason when be oontrasts it 
wi th the understanding: t'Reason, on the other hand, oon-
tents himself with animatin~ a olod of clay somewhere for 
for a moment, and through a word withering all these [obstruo-
tions erected by the understand in#!] to old day cobweos. tt 
(V, 13) 
60Ibid., pp. 310-311. On the reason, Whicher adds, 
"The gr~emancipating privilege of oontemplation was the 
sight of God through Reason, or better, the union with God. 
sinoe the mindts 'vision tis not like the vision of the eye, 
but is union with·the things known." Freedom and Fate, 
p.132. ... --
ii 
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to complete, in this sense, the prowess of the reason. Emer-
son saw as the understanding's basic achievement its'sbil-
ity to help man acquire an appreciation of the singular 
beauty of an individual object. More than this, however, 
the understanding could not accomplish. It could not, as 
could the reason, unite the individual manifestations of 
nature. But this is not to say that the understanding 
would always remain within the limits prescribed by its 
nature, Emerson comments on this in his Journalsl tiThe 
Understanding, the usurping understanding, the lieutenant 
of Reason, his hired man,--the moment the Master is gone, 
steps into his plaoe; the usher commands, sets himself to 
finish what He was doing, but instantly proceeds with his 
own dwarf arohitecture, and thoroughly oheats us, until 
presently for a moment Reason returns, and the slave obeys, 
and his work shrinks into tatters and oobwebs.,,6l 
6lEmerson, Journals, IV, 7'. A.J. Kloeckner would 
oaution one to avoid the idea that "beoause a man's reason 
oan lead,Q1 man, to the right, all he says is right. tt (P. 
-m) Osoar Firkins disagreesl "Man errs, but the Reason 
is infallible. Man sins, but the Reason finds sin merely 
negative. Man dies, but the Reason is deathless. To senses 
nature is absolute; to the Reason it is prOVisional." (F. 
320) 
!:II,II' I' 
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Emerson believed that only the aotivated reason, the 
faoulty of the moral sentiment, could peroeive God in the 
unity of existence and could allow Him to enter and per-
meate man. For if man attempted suoh peroeption with the 
understandin~ alone, he labored futilely with but "half 
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his foroe. ,,62 . Due preoisely to suoh misguided erldeavors, 
Emerson believed "the world·' lacked "unity" and was "broken 
and in heapse,,63 The problem was that "Understanding 
possesses the world • .,64 
The aotivated reason, it has been noted, stands in 
the Emersonian system as the singularly effective foe of 
Fate, whose constrictive nature, for a time, nourished 
Emerson's transient skeptioism, and which, in so doing, 
constructed rature's best barrier against man's reali-
62EmersQn, "Nature," p. 54. 
6'Ibid •• 
64Emerson, Journals, V, 13. On the understand-
ing Emerson oontinues: "I+' fortifies itself in History, 
in Laws, in Institutions, in Property, in the prejudice 
of Birth, of Majorities, in Libraries, in Creeds, in 
Names." (Ibid.) 
1 
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Batien ot hi. infinitude. The jurisdiotion ot the moral 
sentiment in this area i8 more deeply impressed when 
Emerson'. m.taphor tor the prooe •• the reason undergoe. 
in its transter to the •• ral .entiment is oonsidered. In 
it, Emer.en piotures Fate as a hoep whose axle i8 man. 
86 
!h. meral sentiment, the 8tretohed faculty of the reas.n, 
i8 the gathering .f .poke8 that, ~.m the axle to the he.p, 
aecure Pate to man in what is tor hi. a knowledge-gaining 
relationship. Via the spoke., man trac.s eaoh inoh of the 
hoop'a aro.65 
!he funotion of the activated rea.on in the realm of 
man'. que.t tor infinitude i. illumined through compar-
ison to it. previously disou88ed function in the realm of 
skepticism. Pate, whether oonsidered .s the friend of 
akepticism or the f •• of infinitude, remain8 the aame. 
65Emer80n, "Pate," p. '51. Whicher comment. on Emer-
80n'. per80nal problem with Pate. "!o take the leap into 
greatneaa he had to overc •• e two radical difficultie.. the 
1ncon88Cutiven ••• of hi. own moods, the impossibility of 
per.evering the moment. in whioh he telt hi. unity with the 
power within him' and the neoe.sity .f dealing with an eut-
8ide world that remained obdurately independent of hi8 will." 
Freedom and Pate, p. 60. 
"Whatever limits us .e oa11 Pate. • •• The limitations 
refine as the soul purifies, but the ring of necessit" 
is always perched at the top. • •• The limitation is 
impassable by any in.i~ht of man. In ita last and lofti-
est asoensiona, • • • freedom of the will is one of it. 
obedient membere. n66 
87 
As with Emer.on's skeptioism, the mastery of Fate over 
the infinitude of the individual man is eliminated by the 
power of the will. As the faculty of the reason prepares 
for the reception of the Deity through its evolution into 
the faculty et the moral sentiment. the power of the will, 
the natural child of this evolution, &ccosts and emaaoulate. 
Fate. Therefore, sinoe Fate's ability to block man from 
infinitude reaides in its exi.tence aa "unpenetratea oau.eaH ,67 
and sinoe the combined assault of both the power of the will--
which in preparation for the reception of the »eitT clears 
.way obstaol •• --and the faoulty of the reas.n--which funotions 
67 I},id., p. '44. 
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now a8 the moral sentiment, the faoulty through whioh the 
Deity arrives--Fate, a. in the oa.e of Emer8on's skeptioism, 
10se8 ita effioacy. Emerson de80ribes the prooeael "!he 
world,--th1s shadow of the soul, or other me.--11e8 wide 
around. Its attraotions are the key8 whioh unlook my 
thoughts and made me aoquainted with ..,.e1f. 1 run eagerly 
into this resounding tumult. • •• I pierce it. order, I 
dissipate its fear, I di8pose of it within the cirouit of 
my expanding life."68 
Onoe the faculty of the reason, aoting a8 the moral 
sentiment, reoeives its flood of Divinity, infinitude occur. 
in that partioular individual who has exeroi.ed hi. partio-
ular .egment of the univereal faoulty of the reason. What 
further happens to the nature of that faoulty Emereon pointe 
out. After infinitude 1. aohieved, "Reaeon i8 not to be 
distinguished from divine 1.8enoe", for "to oall Reason 'ours' 
68Ralpb Waldo Emer8on, "The American Soholar," Selections 
from Ralph Waldo ~.rson, ed. Stephen Whioher (Boston, 1951), 
~o. 1.J. kIoeoiner 1. of the opinion that Emerson excepted 
no one from thi. prooe.s. "... although so.e men w111 not 
refleot on their oondition, there are none who oannot refleot 
and who would consequently be exoluded de facto from partioi-
pation in the better lite •••• " (F. "5) Gordon agree. 
that dThe deepeat oraving of the spirit of man i8 for an Infin-
ite Being oapable of communion with man •••• " (P. 581) 
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or -human-seems an impert1nen.oe, 80 absolute and confined 
it 18,,,69 He repeats this idea in the sermon "Pray Without 
Oeasing" when he 88YSI "Did you not know that the knowledge 
of God i8 perfeat and immense • • • that your Reason 1s 
God. ,,70 
When, then, in the summer of 1832 Emerson chose per-
sonally to defrock himself of the mini8try,71 he did not 
80 much deny the divinit,y of Christ as recommend and commend 
the Savior for wisely exploiting the tools of His and ever.y 
69Jmeraon, Journal., III, 2'5. Woodberry note. 
the attitude Emerson wished men to have toward the search 
ot the reason tor the Deitys -Thus the wisdom of lite 
when 8ummed lie. in a complete and enthusiastio surrender 
to Qod alone, suoh that every thought and act shall give 
free course to the divine, streaming into the soul and ener-
gizing there under the control of the Over-will." (P. 126) 
70MOGittert, p. 4. 
7lVan Doren, p. 1'4. His rupture with the ministry 
resulted from his los. of faith in the Lord-s Supper and 
the Divinity of Christ (Ibid.). "Emersonts act of renun~ 
eiation rdenying the Lor~Supp.rJ was not only important aa 
determin1ng the nature of his oareer, but signifioant a180 
of the transition ot New England from theologioal dogmatiaa 
to romantic liberty." (Trent, I, .,63) Spiller writea: "Hi. 
rebellion, when it finally came, was two-tolds against the 
last vestiges of ecolesiastical authority over the spiritual 
lite of the individual. and against eighteenth oenturY ration-
alism which had killed s.pirituality, be thought, when it 
11 
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man'. nature whioh might, and did in His case, procure for 
the practitioner infinitude. As Emerson remarked later 
in his Journals, -The history of Jesus is only the hlstor" 
ot evel!7 man written large. '!he name. he be.t... on J eaua 
belong to h1a.elf,--Uedlator, Redeemer, savior_ ft72 That 
Imeraon aotually believed in eaoh man'. potential infin-
itude i., therefore, undeniable. All that man n.ed do to 
reali •• it waa exert h1s1ndependenoe and hi. faoultie •• 
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"!be thinker look. tor God in the direction of the oon-
Beioueesa. the ohurolnaan out of it. If you ask the tormer 
tor his definition of God, he would ans.er, 'my poss1bl1it,r'. 
for hi. definition ot Man, t~ actuality.'ft7' 
denied revelation. The first pointed to a final sohi.. in 
whioh each man become. hi. own ohurch, the .econd sought to 
provide the rule. tor a ne. and p81'8onal orthodoxy_ In the 
end .elf-reliance waa sanctioned by submiasion to the 'Beau-
tiful Necessity_'· (I. ",) 
72lmeraon, Jour.n~, V, 478. 
7' Ibid., VI, 441. 
CHAPTER V 
sm1MAl' ION 
As we have s.en, the problem here is to establish that 
Emerson employed essentially identioal tools--tbe faoulty 
of the reason, in its evolutionary form a8 the faculty of 
the moral .entiment--in his transient advooacy of the legit-
imacy 01 a skeptical philosophy and in his inetfaceable 
adherence to the dootrine of the infinitude of the private 
man. Both the concept of skeptici" and the infinitude 
dootrine are analysed in themselves and in their mutual 
relations. 
Of the Emersonian work oonsulted, the e.says "Oirolee," 
"Experience," "~onta1gne. or, The Skeptic," and ftFate,ft as 
well as the 'author'. Journal. are noted a8 the appropriately 
primary ore from whioh this paper is refined. Attention 1. 
a180 oal1ed to other of b.ereon'. works and to the pertinent 
soholarship in the field. 
!here is little critioa1 work available which relate. 
direotly to the exact problem of this paper. ~o works of 
soholarship, e.L. Young'. Emerson'. Montaigne and J.O. 
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MoOormiok's "Emerson'. Theory 01 Human Gre.tness,· are 
substantially different trom but, admittedly, valuable to 
the immediate endeavor. 
"Circle." i8 the.."prologue of ,!mer8onian akepticism, 
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it relates the author's philosophical unsettlement and 
tells of his belief in the impermanence of any oredo of 
stabilised reality in either the physioal or spiritual 
universe. !he e88ay offers an initial characterisation of 
the skeptio a.neither the scoffer, pessimist, .nor opt~18t. 
but as the considerer, the experimenter, and the unsettler. 
"Experience" delineates the nature of the individual 
man who will have to grapple with the ohasm of divergence 
thai exist. bet.een the actual world and ita ideal counter-
part. It also pr~~ent8 the 110rds of 1J1t., Illusion, Tem-
perament, SUoces.ion, surt80e, surprise, Reality, and 
Subjectiveness. Bach lArd of Life fUnotions a. an agent 
that i.t in a variety of ways, aotive in every man'. lite. 
The oomposite .ffeot the.e Lords have on eaoh man la unique 
in that eaoh man formulate. a different interpretation .s 
a result ot hi. confliot with the world. 
1.1,111 
II: 
~he Lord SUbjectiveness affects man both in his rela-
tions with other .en and in his relatione with Nature. In 
it. contact with Waturet man's SUbjeotiveness first create. 
what it i8 later to interpret. Similarly, it aftects the 
regretfully ainimal knowledge one man haa of another. Bmer-
80n's oonoept of sin adds to his idea of Subjeotiveness. 
!be sinner views sin from the intelleot, the observer of 
the sinner views ain from the oon8cienoe. The tormer finds 
s1n privation, tha letter, evil. The sin viewed from the 
oonsotenoe, Emerson holda, oause. oonfu.ion of thought, 
resultant is an inore .. e in the SUbjeotiveness ot the 
indiVidual involved. 
!he Lord Illusion repels man from reality, it causes 
hi. to di.trust, susp.ot, the intelligenoe offered by hi. 
intellect and ....... A. a result, only a aubjective per-
oeption of apparent exi.tanoecan be made. !he Lord ~6m­
perament clo.ely oorresponds1D Lord Illusion in that 'it 
cause. both stranger. and friends of man to pre.ent them-
selves to hi. 88 other than they are. It mature., in etf.et, 
the oumulus intelleot whioh oan 40 ftO more than reject 
reality the few times it oontaets it. 
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!he remaining Lords, Surfaoe, SUcoe •• ion, and surprise, 
have dual significanoe. Es.entially they, like the others, 
contuse man, but, unlike the others, they create their 
chaoa in a more palatable fashion. 
\ 
With the Lo~. of Life enumerated, Emerson requests 
that the body of skeptical tbought be incorporated into 
reoognised oreeds and that it be granted the statue of 
acoeptanoe. Skeptioism, at this time, is doubtlea8 a part 
of Emersonts tho~t. 
In tbe Journal entries whioh complement "~ontaigne, 
or, the Skeptic," Emerson reaffirms his inability to estimate 
the value of any specific perception. In the essay it.elf, 
he accomplishes three thingss he lists the kinds of men 
in existence, he extraots the skeptic from their midst; and 
he constructe, later to destroy via the moral sentiment, the 
skeptic's validity in society_ 
Most men, Emerson believee, are either geniuses or men 
of mere talent, or, vicariously, abstraotionists or material-
ists. The genius, or abstraotionist, is a man of thought, the 
man ecstatioally in love with the Infinite, the Absolute, 
and the Real. S~v. in Emersonts skeptical period, the 
:11
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genius is the praotitioner ot intinitude, he permits hi. 
faculty of the rea80n to evolve into the tacult.y ot the 
moral .enti.ent. The man of mere talent, the matertalist, 
on the other hand, i8 enamored of the Pinite, the Relative, 
or the Apparent. His talent i8 mere -applioability" with-
out originality, it i8 immeasurably le88 than genius, though 
i tiL 'evinc er would not bave one think ao. 
Emerson, in hie skeptioal period, believes that both 
the genius and the man of mere talent are extremiats. Prom 
the mean tGwers the skeptio. He haa not the exaggeration 
of either side. He admits tilat man i8 limited in hie abil-
ity to reach God through philo8ophical journey.. He know. 
that contlicting evidences pr~hibit any chance of univer8al 
truth in anyone cre.d. He neither affirm. nor den188. 
The true skeptic, however, is not an ioonoclast. He 
doe. not with bravado strip respectability from oreeds. 
Rather, he orbits society and observes from th. distance 
what in society actually i. and what actually i8 not. He 
holds the "suspended judgment." 
Emerson creates a very stable foundation for the skep-
tic in aociety,--a foundation that orumbles in the path of 
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'the moral sentiment, wh1,oh 1s the faculty ot the reason, 
extended to its capacity, in union with the Deity. Emerson's 
abrupt resignation from the position ot skeptic is nccept-
'-able it one realizes tn-a't hie romance with disbelief 1s 
merely an evanescent flirtation in 9 life of exquisite 
fidelity. *fo say, however, that he at Y10 time gave any 
B6rious consideration to skeptioism as a legitimate philos-
ophy is to mock the sinoe~ty of the skeptical essays. 
As we have asserted, the faoulty of the moral sentiment 
1s the faculty of the re •• on aotualised. ~h. reason actual-
lze. when it achleves unity with the Deity; for it institutes, 
at the precise moment of unIty, infinitude 1n the achiever. 
Notably, the actualized reason not only nourishes infin-
itude, but evisceratea skepticism as well. fo sustain the 
actualization of the reason, the reali •• r must actively 
reoognize and enoourage the new ll~e the aoral sentiment 
imparts. 
The essay "Fate" inters dead skepticism. !he moral 
sentiment, its slayer, a1de in its burial. Pste i8 limit-
ation. Left to profper. it clenches man in a vise. Never-
theless, it oannot withIn its bo~.ds deny existenoe to its 
I 
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major opponent, the fr.edom ot the will. !bis free40m, 
however, i8 p088essed and exercised by only a tn souls, 
OVer aost souls Fate reigns. 
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Onoe the will free. itselt in man, the 00rr8Spon41nS 
intellect gra.p. the nature of Pate. !his knowledge debil-
itates rate's constrictive oontrol, and tre. will and Fate 
truly co-exist •• the former hacks a't and po_ela the 
tounda'tion of 'the lat'ter. Freedom of the will is aohieved 
by the power of the will, an energy whioh owea it. tribu-
tary existence to the evolutionary growth of the faoulty 
of the reason. The power of the will decimate. Fate and 
the Deity poure into man through the faoul ty of the moral 
.entiment. 
. 
!he funotions ot the faoul'ty of the moral. senti.en't. 
tben, are the oonnective ti.euea between Emerson t 8 concept 
of skeptioism and his dootrine of the infinitude of the 
priva'te man. One of i't. function., aa we have .e.n, employe 
a by-product of it. creation, the power of the w111, to 
eliminate an impre •• ive toe, Pate, 1n order 'tha't unity w1'th 
'the Deit,., 1ta goal, might be reached. 
In what .en.e !Beraou thought man God a8 a result of 
his union with the neity i. open to thr.e po •• ible inter-
I. 
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pretationa. Either man ae an individual is in bimself at 
all times God, or each man •• an individual i. one portion 
of a (Jod Whom all comprise" or,lastl,.. ae tbis paper con-
tend., eaoh man ie potentially God, bis reali •• tion of tbis 
potential dependent upon hi. willingness to achieve it. to 
endure the necessary work to achieve it. 
Imerson's bedging qualification. of his statementa 
on the first two inte~retatlons 41s.is., in effect, their 
tenability and argue, a. a reault, the yalldi't7 of the 
tblrd p0881bilit7--that man i. potentiall,. God. 
ElDerson -,s ooncept of nature in relation to man' III i%din-
i tude i. ambiguou8 in the aen.e tbat hi. estimate 0'1 nature 
i., as 1t was in his oonfliot with skeptici.m, at onoe bene-
fioial and de.truotive. For the most part, he believe. that 
li!1 
;I! 
:i' 
III 
, 
1 
:1 
I! 
'I 
"I 
nature is benefioial and that froll it man, it. core, gather. ~, 
God. 
'fhat man t 8 app:J'oach to God might be diff10ul t, might 
be braked by a oonfliot with obstruotions ereoted b,. nature 
it •• lf, i8 the major reason for Emerson'. negative interpret-
ation of ,natv.re, whioh peaks in his skeptioal period. Oircum-
soriptive diatraetions--in a word, Fate,--mole.t man in hi. 
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quest for infinitude. To eradicate distractions, man must, 
a8 he do.. in his victory over skepticism, realize his 
nature, know, 88 a result, him.elf in addition to the 
functions of his faoulties. 
The funotion of the faculty of the understanding in 
manta .earch for infinitude 18 one of subordination to the 
faoul ty of tbe reaaon.'l'he understar.4ing remains in the 
baekgroUt'ld and coaplements, makes whole,the reason aa it 
evolve. into-the faculty ot the moral sentiment. 
!he roots of Emereonts ooncepte ot the reason and the 
understanding are lodged in German Romanticism. They co.e 
to the Amerioan Transoendentalist through hi. personal 
aoquaintance w1 th, and reading oft the English Romantios. 
Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Oarlyle introduoe him to Kan~, 
Goethe, Swedeborg, and SpinOD, among numereus others. 
From Wordsworth Emerson no doubt reoeive. influence in 
his belief 1n the interpenetration of God 1n nature. !hrough 
Oarlyle, he meet. all of Goethe and aome of Kant, and 1. 
exposed to the vaoillating oonoept of the »eity--peraonal 
or impersonal--that aturdily Kl'ew in Emerson' s skepti.oal 
period. 
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Despite Emerson'. ownership of a penoil-scrawled trana-
lation of Kant's Oritique ~ Pure Reason, Ooleridge. oritics 
agree, brings Emerson to grips with the German Romantic'. 
ooncepta of the reason and the understanding. Coleridge 
lives Emerson hi$ personal oorruptions of the Xantian ideas, 
and Emerson proceeds further to oorrupt th .. , or, rather, to 
mould them to his own uee. In any event, he leans heavily 
on Coleridge'. analysis of their natures. 
On various points on the faoulty of the reason, Emer-
eon and Coleridge, in the general sense, agree. ~hey both 
believe that the faoulty of the reason reveals God ~ man, 
reveals the unity of all proximate t:ruth. in <J.od, and reve.la 
the nature ot the oonduot that oorresponds correctly to the 
God known. Similarly, they both hold that the reason 1s an 
intuitive, the understanding a systematically logical faoulty. 
The latter funotion. in all men, the tormer in a fe •• 
Emerson personally stresses that only the faoulty of 
the reason actualized--the faoulty of the moral sent1m.n~-­
has the ability to see God in the unity of existenoe ana 
that only it can allow God to pour through and permeate man 
who, 1n thankful anticipation, realize. infinitude. And as 
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his bou~ wi~h skeptioism assure., the death of Fate must be 
a faot before thie infinitude can be realized. Ita expir-
ation in the intin1~e assertion ocours no more ea811y 
than i~ did in the 4i88i88&1 of akeptioi... Again the 
power of the will, which activates during the birth of the 
moral 8entiment, disarms Fate and pre~·.s for the onrush of 
Deity. The moral aenti.ent--tbe reason 81gnal17 taut--
aceepta the Deity. knows its inftni~., and oel.bra~ •• ita 
aohievement of Emerson'a definition of Go4--"my possibility." 
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